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Deconstructing the Legislative Veto*
Girardeau A. Spann**
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated more federal statutes in a single day than it had in all of its prior history. In so doing, the Court also dramatically altered the
allocation of governmental power between Congress and the
President. At least that is how the press viewed the significance of INS v. Chadha,' the decision invalidating the legislative veto device on which Congress had come to rely as an
expedient method of controlling the exercise of executive discretion. Whether or not the hyperbole proves to have been
warranted, the decision does possess a certain intrigue-it is
not possible to tell whether the case is right or wrong.
Chadha illustrates, in a striking manner, that legal doctrine
is indeterminate. This is true whether the term "doctrine" is
defined narrowly to include mere legal rules or is defined
broadly to include the social policies served by the rules as
well. After all available constitutional principles have been
brought to bear upon the problem, it is still not possible to ascertain in a satisfactory doctrinal manner whether the legislative veto is constitutional or unconstitutional. Moreover, such
indeterminacy characterizes every effort made to arrive at a
principled resolution of every legal problem. In fact, the closer
we look at any legal problem the more apparent it becomes
that our analytical skills have been outdistanced by our ability
to perceive unavoidable contradictions and inconsistencies.
Far from being a cause for alarm, however, proper appreciation
of our analytical inadequacies may stimulate innovative insights that permit us to confront legal problems on more satisfying conceptual levels. Accordingly, the true significance of
* © 1984 by Girardeau A. Spann and THE MNESOTA LAw REVIEW
FOUNDATION. All rights reserved.
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cases such as Chadha may lie in their ultimate propensity to
launch us into new analytical paradigms.
Part I of this Article undertakes a doctrinal analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by the legislative veto in order to
demonstrate that doctrine is incapable of resolving those issues. The legal arguments that can be made both for and
against the constitutionality of the veto are equally flawed, and
there is no principled basis for choosing among them. Moreover, there is a self-defeating circularity inherent in constitutional analysis of the legislative veto that renders any
resolution of the constitutional issues logically unacceptable.
Part II suggests that the indeterminacy present in the legislative veto context can be extrapolated to all legal analysis
because of fatal defects in the concept of principled decisionmaking itself. All principles can be "deconstructed," or shown
to be equally supportive of contradictory outcomes. Part II
then goes on to suggest that appreciation rather than suppression of inevitable indeterminacy may ultimately permit us to
understand our legal and social problems in qualitatively different ways that overcome the apparent contradictions inhabiting
our present analytical paradigms.
I. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
Under the traditional view of the legal system, disputes are
resolved in accordance with generally accepted principles of
law that constrain the discretion of presiding judges and generate particular results. Although some decisions may be questionable, or even wrong, the defects in those decisions stem
from the failure to ascertain the manner in which the governing
principles and policies properly apply. Once they are correctly
understood, however, the principles illuminate the path to the
correct result. Moreover, adherence to this principled mode of
decisionmaking is what ensures effective operation of the judicial process by securing for judicial decisions a degree of public
acceptability that they could not command if they were merely
products of the judges' personal predilections. 2 This traditional
system, however, presupposes the existence of a coherent, determinate set of doctrinal principles; but there is reason to believe that no such set of principles in fact exists. The Supreme
Court's decision in INS v. Chadha,3 invalidating the legislative
2. The traditional view of the legal system is elaborated more fully in
Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L REv. 585, 588-92 (1983).
3. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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veto on constitutional grounds, provides an example of a situation in which doctrine is unable to provide a satisfactory resolution of the pertinent legal issues.

A. THE DECISION
1.

Context

A legislative veto is an action-generally the passage of a
resolution-taken by Congress, one House, a committee, or an
individual member of Congress that invalidates an act of the
executive branch through something less than the full legislative process. 4 In Chadha, the Attorney General, acting pursu4. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGuLATORY

PoucY 95-96 (1979); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrTUTONAL
LAW 399-401 (10th ed. 1980); G. ROBINSON, E. GELHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINIS-

TRATvE PRocEss 78-80 (1980) [hereinafter cited as THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAw 161-63 (1978).
Several articles have been written about the constitutionality and policy
desirability of the legislative veto, many of which are cited in Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Chadha. See 103 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12 (White, J., dissenting).
Among the articles generally favoring the legislative veto, including those
cited by Justice White, are Dry, The CongressionalVeto and ConstitutionalSeparation of Powers, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTr ONAL ORDER 195 (J.
Bessette & J. Tulis eds. 1981); Abourezk, The CongressionalVeto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachmenton Legislative Prerogatives,52 IND.
L.J. 323 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962); Javits & Klein, CongressionalOversight and the
Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977); Miller
& Knapp, The CongressionalVeto: Preserving the ConstitutionalFramework, 52
IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law:
Delegation,the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent"Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L
REV. 1064 (1981); Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional
Function,23 U. KAN. L. REV. 277 (1975); Rodino, CongressionalReview of Executive Action, 5 SETON HALL 489 (1974); Schwartz, Legislative Control of AdministrativeRules and Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L REV.
1031 (1955); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L REV. 351 (1978); Stewart, Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593 (1976); Comment, Congressional
Oversight of Administrative Discretion: Defining the ProperRole of the Legislative Veto, 26 Am. U.L. REv. 1018 (1977); Comment, Legislative Control Over AdministrativeAction: The Laying System, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 515 (1977);
Comment, Legislative Review of Administrative Action:"Is the Cure Worse than
the Illness? 1978 S. ILL. UJJ. 579; Comment, CongressionalOversight of Administrative Agencies: The Legislative Veto, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 131 (1982);
Comment, The Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto, 23 WM. & MARY I REV.
123 (1981).
Among the books and articles generally disfavoring the legislative veto, including those cited by Justice White, are J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:
UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977); Bell with Ostrow, Congress--The Ultimate
Source of Regulatory Power, 68 A.B. J. 1088 (1982); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive on a Leash? 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); FitzGer-
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ant to his statutory authority as head of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, invoked a hardship provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to permit an otherwise deportable alien to remain in the United States. The House of
Representatives later overruled that hardship determination
through passage of a resolution, as it was authorized to do
under a one-House veto provision of the same statute.5 The
ald, Congressional Oversight or CongressionalForesight: Guidelinesfrom the
Founding Fathers, 28 AD. L. REV. 429 (1976); Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L,
REV. 569 (1953); Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in AdministrativeRulemaking,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735 (1979); Jackson, A PresidentialLegal
Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1953); Larsen, Legislative Delegationand Oversight: A PromisingApproachfrom Oregon, 14 WILAEMrrrE LJ. 1 (1977); Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of CongressionalPower, 68 VA. I. REV.
253 (1982); McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLuM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALuF. L.
REV. 565 (1953); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A FalseRemedy for System Overload, REG,, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19; Taylor, Legislative Vetoes and the Massachusetts Separation of Powers Doctrine, 13 SuFFoLK U.I REV. 1 (1979); Watson,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CA_zF. L. REV. 983 (1975); Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The
ProbableResponse to a ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DuKE L.J. 285; Note, The
Legislative Veto in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1029 (1977); Note, Legislative Oversight and the South Carolina Experience, 34 S.C.L. REV. 595 (1982); Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto:
Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 81 COLuM. L, REV. 1721 (1981).
Articles about the legislative veto that cannot fairly be categorized as
favoring or disfavoring the device include Kaiser, CongressionalAction to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L REV. 667
(1980); Ribicoff, CongressionalOversight and Regulatory Reforn, 28 AD. . REV.
415 (1976); Strauss, Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuxE L.J. 789.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 2771-72. More specifically, Mr. Chadha, an East Indian born
in Kenya who holds a British passport, was admitted to the United States in
1966 pursuant to a nonimmigrant student visa. Id. at 2770. Chadha's student
visa expired in 1972, after he had received a bachelor's degree and a master's
degree. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980). The expiration of this
student visa made Chadha a deportable alien, and in 1973, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service commenced deportation proceedings against him, pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982).
103 S. Ct. at 2770.
Although Chadha was technically deportable, he applied to the Attorney
General for a suspension of his deportation on the grounds of extreme hardship, id., arguing that, because of his East Indian racial derivation, it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to return to Kenya or to go to
Great Britain. 634 F.2d at 408. On June 25, 1974, after a hearing, the Attorney
General suspended Chadha's deportation on the grounds of extreme hardship,
pursuant to § 244(c) (1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1). 103 S. Ct. at 2770. The
Attorney General also notified Congress of the suspension, as required under
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House of Representatives was, therefore, able to invalidate an
otherwise legally effective act of the executive branch without
the concurrence of either the Senate or the President. The legislative veto exercised in Chadha was used to invalidate an administrative agency adjudication of the rights of a single
individual, but Congress has also authorized the use of legisla6
tive vetoes to invalidate agency rules of general applicability.
Congress has also sought to apply the veto procedure to direct
presidential actions, such as arms sales and commitments of
7
American troops to foreign countries.
The legislative veto was first introduced in 1932 as a device
for maintaining congressional control of executive actions pursuant to broad statutory delegations of authority to the Executive. Broad statutory delegations accompanied the increase in
federal regulatory activity that began during the New Deal,
when Congress chose to rely on specialized administrative
the same provision of the Act in order to give Congress an opportunity to review the suspension for possible legislative reversal through a resolution
passed by either House in accordance with § 244(c) (2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(c) (2). Id. at 2770-71.
Neither House of Congress acted on the suspension of Chadha's deportation for a year and a half. Then, on December 19, 1975, shortly before the end
of the statutory time period during which Congress could act in Chadha's case,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution overruling the suspension of
Chadha's deportation. Because of the rush to finish its business before the end
of the session, the resolution had not been printed as resolutions typically are.
Rather, it was simply read orally on the floor of the House of Representatives.
The resolution, which was approximately fifty words long, gave no reason for
overruling the suspension, nor did the floor statement introducing and explaining the resolution. The floor statement, made by the Chairperson of the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, merely recited that
after reviewing 340 cases in which the Attorney General had suspended deportation, the Subcommittee had concluded that the six aliens named in the resolutions did not satisfy the statutory hardship standard. Chadha was one of the
six. The resolution was passed without debate by voice vote. Id. at 2771-72;
H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40,800 (1975). Ironically, the
Immigration Subcommittee had also singled out six other aliens for suspension
in an expedited manner one year earlier, after reviewing the hundreds of cases
presented to the Subcommittee that year. 103 S. Ct. at 2771-72 n.3.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha deported in
accordance with the House resolution. Id. at 2772. Chadha appealed that order
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held the oneHouse veto exercised in Chadha's case to be unconstitutional on separation-ofpowers grounds. 634 F.2d 408, 429-36. The Supreme Court then affirmed that
ruling in the decision that is the focus of the present article. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
6. See, for example, the legislative veto provisions at issue in the FERC
and Consumers Union cases discussed infra note 14.
7. See, e.g., Arms Export Control Act, § 211, 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b) (1982), and
War Powers Resolution, § 5, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982). A list of fifty-six statutes
containing legislative veto provisions in effect at the time the Chadha case was
decided is reprinted as an appendix to Justice White's dissent in Chadha. See
103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 (White, J., dissenting).
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agencies to implement new regulatory schemes dependent
upon technical expertise that Congress itself did not possess.
Moreover, because broad delegations could be phrased in general terms, susceptible to varying interpretations, their use
avoided political stalemates that might have precluded passage
of more precise enabling legislation. The legislative veto made
these broad statutory delegations more palatable to Congress
than they otherwise would have been, permitting objectionable
exercises of executive discretion to be efficiently overruled
without the inconvenience and political uncertainty inherent in
the full legislative process. Accordingly, the popularity of the
legislative veto increased over time as congressional use of
broad delegations became more frequent and as criticism of executive exercises of discretion became more vocal. 8 In the fifty
years after its inception, the legislative veto was inserted in
nearly 200 statutes, 9 and although most expired by their own
terms, more than fifty veto provisions remained in effect on the
day that Chadha was decided.' 0 In fact, congressional enchantment with the veto device has grown so much that bills subjecting all administrative agency regulations to a legislative veto
have been introduced and seriously considered in each of the
last three Congresses."
While proponents of the legislative veto argued that it provided an innovative solution to the problem of overseeing a
large federal bureaucracy,12 opponents of the veto argued that
it was inefficient and merely provided well-financed special interest groups an opportunity to lobby congressional committees for reversal on political grounds of decisions they had lost
on the merits before administrative agencies.' 3 Each side marshalled constitutional arguments to fortify its position, and, after several false starts, the Supreme Court was finally cajoled
8. See 103 S. Ct. at 2792-96 (White, J., dissenting); see generally S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 95-102; G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 399; L.
TMBE, supra note 4, at 161-63; cf. THE ADmmsTRATvE PROCESS, supra note 4, at

45, 78-79.
9. See 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting); see also Miller & Knapp,
supra note 4, at 371.
10. See supra note 7.
11. See, for example, H.R. 1776, introduced by Congressman Levitas in

each of the 96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses. H.R. 1776, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 1776, 97th Cong.,.lst Sess. (1981); H.R. 1776, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1983).

12. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 97-102; G. GuNTHER,
supra note 4, at 399-401; THE ADMmTxRAE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 78-80,
851-55.
13. See id.
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into considering the merits of the constitutional issues.14
2.

The Opinions

In Chadha, the Supreme Court held the one-House veto
exercised in that case to be unconstitutional. Six members of
the Court signed an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
which rested on broad separation of powers grounds that ap14.

Chadha was not the first case in which the Supreme Court was given

the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the legislative veto. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Court confronted the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision in the Federal Elections Campaign
Act, but chose not to address the issue after disposing of the case on other constitutional grounds. Id. at 140 n.176. Justice White, however, wrote a separate

opinion expressing the view that the legislative veto was constitutional. Id. at
284-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Buckley involved
rulemaking rather than adjudication, which was involved in Chadha. A year
later, in Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950, affig Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam), the Supreme Court again declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the veto provision of the Campaign Act, affirming a
lower court decision that avoided the issue on ripeness grounds. See 559 F.2d
at 647-50. A dissenting opinion written by Judge MacKinnon when the case was
before the court of appeals argued that the veto provision was unconstitutional,
expressly disagreeing with Justice White's reasoning in Buckley. 559 F.2d at
685-90 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The following year, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Atkins v. United States, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), thereby permitting the decision of a divided Court of Claims to remain in effect. The Court of
Claims had upheld the one-House veto provision of the Federal Salary Act of
1967, after a challenge by federal judges who had been denied a pay raise as a
result of a veto exercised under the Act. 556 F.2d 1028, 1058-71 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). The same year, the Court also
denied certiorari in a Fourth Circuit case raising the constitutionality of the
same veto provision. See McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
In Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a court
of appeals panel in the District of Columbia Circuit held the one-House veto
provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act unconstitutional after the House of
Representatives vetoed natural gas pricing regulations issued by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. In Consumers Union v. FrC, 691 F.2d 575
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam), ard mer., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), both
Houses of Congress vetoed a regulation promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission to govern certain warranty and disclosure practices in connection
with the sale of used cars to consumers. The full Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held the two-House veto provision of the FTC Improvements Act of 1980 unconstitutional, relying on the broad reasoning of the
FERC case. Both cases were pending before the Supreme Court when that
Court decided Chadha, and both were summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court shortly after issuance of the Chadha decision. Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumers Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
Ironically, Chadha's marriage to an American citizen, which made him eligible to remain in the United States, may have eliminated the need for a ruling
in the Chadha case. In this sense, the Chadha decision was advisory in nature.
Neither the Ninth Circuit, 634 F.2d at 417 n.6, nor the Supreme Court, 103 S. Ct.
2776-77, however, viewed Chadha's marriage as mooting his case.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:473

pear to invalidate all varieties of legislative vetoes.15 Justice
Powell concurred in the judgment on narrower separation of
powers grounds applicable to the Chadha case itself.16 Justice
White dissented, relying on a variety of theories that he viewed
as sufficient to establish the constitutionality of the legislative
veto.17 Justice Rehnquist also dissented, concluding that, if the
veto provision was invalid, the entire statute authorizing suspension of the plaintiffs deportation was invalid because the
veto provision was not severable from the rest of the statute.' 8
Although Justice Rehnquist did not discuss the constitutionality of the veto provision itself, there is reason to believe that he
too might view it as unconstitutional. 9
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion held the legislative
veto exercised in Chadha to be unconstitutional on broad
grounds that extend not only to the Chadha case itself, but apparently to all legislative vetoes. 20 The majority reasoned that
the exercise of a legislative veto is unconstitutional because it
constitutes a "law" that is not "enacted" in accordance with the
procedures specified in article I of the Constitution. 21 Because
those procedures were designed to ensure that the separate
constituencies represented by the President and each House of
Congress had appropriate input into legislative policy decisions, failure to comply with the prescribed procedures in making such decisions violated the separation of powers principles
22
implicit in the Constitution.
More specifically, the bicameralism provision of article I,
sections 1 and 7, requires all laws to be passed by both Houses
of Congress, thereby ensuring that the laws are acceptable
both to the state interests represented in the Senate and to the
23
local interests represented in the House of Representatives.
In addition, the presentment provisions of article I, section 7,
15. See 103 S. Ct. at 2780-88 (1983).
16. Id. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 2792-811 (White, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
20. See 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting); see also Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (per curiam), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (invalidating two-House veto
with respect to rulemaking); Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (invalidating one-House veto with
respect to rulemaking).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 2784-87.
22. Id. The separate-constituency theory was articulated most clearly by
the court of appeals in the FERC case. See 673 F.2d at 464-65.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2783-84.
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clauses 2 and 3, state that all laws or actions requiring the concurrence of both Houses shall be presented to the President,
who is empowered to veto them, thereby precluding their effectiveness unless they are repassed by two-thirds majorities in
each House.24 The presentment requirement ensures that the
laws are acceptable to, or least influenced by, the national interests represented by the President, as well as the interests
25
represented in Congress.
The majority opinion rejected the suggestion that a legislative veto is something other than "legislation," and therefore
not subject to the article I enactment procedures, by emphasizing that the legislative veto, like traditional forms of legislation,
alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of people outside
the legislative branch of government, and by stressing that a
legislative veto constitutes a policy choice of the type normally
embodied in legislation. 26 By viewing a legislative veto as an
inchoate "law," the majority opinion implies that all legislative
vetoes would violate the presentment clauses of the Constituveto would viotion, and that anything less than a two-House
27
late the bicameralism clause as well.
Justice Powell, concurring in the result but not in the majority opinion, criticized the majority for issuing a broad ruling
that appeared to invalidate all legislative vetoes, arguing that
the atypical Chadha dispute should instead have been resolved
on narrower grounds. 28 In his view, the legislative veto exercised in Chadha was an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial
power: by overruling the Attorney General's application of the
statutory hardship criteria to the facts of the plaintiff's case, the
House of Representatives had, in essence, engaged in judicial
29
review of the Attorney General's actions. Moreover, such legislative determination of the scope and meaning of the legislature's own enactments undermined the important
constitutional separation of law-making and law-applying functions in a way that posed the precise danger that the Framers
sought to avoid. It subjected individual rights to the unchecked
actions of legislative bodies-who are accountable only to the
whims of shifting majorities-without the procedural safe24. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
25. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-83. The presentment clause was also designed to help
prevent congressional abrogation of presidential power. Id. at 2782.
26. Id. at 2784-88.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2788-89. (Powell, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2789-92.
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guards available in a court which insulate those rights from abrogation by the majority. 30 Although Justice Powell's
disposition would apparently apply to all types of legislative vetoes exercised in an adjudicatory context, his opinion purports
not to address the constitutionality of those vetoes that might
be exercised with respect to more general executive actions
having a less immediate impact on identifiable individuals.3 1
Justice White's dissent also criticized the apparent breadth
of the majority opinion, noting that it did not distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication or executive and independent agency actions. 32 Unlike Justice Powell, however, Justice
White believed that the constitutionality of legislative vetoes
was sustainable under a variety of theories.33 After terming the
veto device "an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major
constitutional and policy differences, assures the accountability
of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress'
control over lawmaking,"34 Justice White offered four basic arguments favoring the validity of legislative vetoes.
First, because a legislative veto does not create a new law,
but merely negates executive action, it is not a legislative act
subject to the article I bicameralism and presentment procedures found by the majority to have been violated. A legislative veto is no more a law subject to those procedures than is a
35
presidential veto.
Second, because the Court has upheld broad congressional
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies, and
even to private parties, who act without adhering to the procedures specified in article I, it follows that Congress may also
make narrower delegations to administrative agencies subject
to legislative vetoes that are exercised without adhering to the
article I procedures.36 Stated more succinctly, if administrative
agencies can make law independent of the article I procedures,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2788-89, 2792.
32. Id. at 2792-93, 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Although the theory for upholding the constitutionality of the legislative veto articulated by Justice White in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 284-86
(1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), might have been
limited to rulemaking, which was all that was involved in Buckley, Justice
White's position in Chadha appears to extend to rulemaking and adjudication
contexts.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2795 (White, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2799-801.
36. Id. at 2801-04.
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so can a House of Congress. 37
Third, as a functional matter, separation of powers principles are honored rather than abrogated under the legislative
veto procedure because the status quo cannot be changed without the concurrence of the Executive and both Houses of Congress. The status quo-the plaintiffs deportability--cannot be
changed unless the Attorney General suspends deportation,
which operates as a proposal for legislation, and both Houses
approve of that proposal, as evidenced by their failure to veto
the suspension. 38 This construct may well uphold the oneHouse veto only at the expense of invalidating the two-House
veto. A two-House veto would permit the disapproval of one
House, evidenced by its veto of the suspension proposal, to be
negated by the approval of the other House, evidenced by its
failure to veto the suspension proposal, thereby permitting the
status quo to be changed without the concurrence of the vetoing House. 39 Recognizing this apparent anomaly, Justice White
concludes that the two-House veto is simply more suspect than
the one-House veto. 40 If the two-House veto must be invaliJustice White at
dated in order to save the one-House veto,
41
sacrfice.
the
make
to
willing
times appears
Fourth, the legislative veto usurps neither executive nor judicial functions, because the sphere of executive autonomy is
statutorily limited to applying laws in circumstances where no
veto has been exercised, and Congress has precluded judicial
for its own judgment under
review of those matters reserved
42
scheme.
veto
the legislative
Justice White expressly limits his defense to one- and perhaps two-House vetoes, disclaiming any intent to address committee vetoes. 43 Finally, while acknowledging the breadth of
37. This argument was stated more directly by Justice White in his dissent
from the Court's summary affirmance of the FERC and Consumers Union
cases, where independent agency rulemaking was involved. See Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556, 3557 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556, 3557 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting).
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2804-08 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2807-08.
40. Id. at 2808.
41. Id. The fact that Justice White dissented from the Court's invalidation
of the two-House veto in the Consumers Union case indicates that he is not really prepared to hold the two-House veto unconstitutional under the theory
that the Attorney General's action is a proposal for legislation. See 103 S. Ct.
3556, 3557 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 151-57.
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2808-10 (White, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2798 n.15. Justice White never explains why committee vetoes
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the majority's holding, Justice White expresses the hope that
its impact will be narrowed in future decisions by permitting a
legislative veto to operate as definitive evidence of congressional intent to have withheld statutory authorization for agencies to take vetoed actions. 44
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented on
the grounds that the legislative veto provision at issue in
Chadha was not severable from that portion of the Immigration and Nationality Act that authorized hardship suspensions
of deportation. 45 Although the Act did contain a severability
clause, it created only a presumption of severability. Here, in
light of the general rule that the scope of statutes should not be
expanded by treating invalid exception provisions as severable,
and in light of the history of congressional reluctance to grant
unchecked discretion to the Executive concerning immigration
matters, the presumption of severability was overcome.46 Justice Rehnquist believed it unlikely that Congress would have
enacted the hardship provision if it had known that the legislative veto procedure would not be available to review hardship
determinations.
By viewing the veto provision as nonseverable, Justice
Rehnquist was able to dispose of the case on nonconstitutional
grounds because the plaintiff would have lost regardless of the
way in which the constitutional issues were resolved. In addition, Justice Rehnquist's approach enabled him to focus on the
legal standard governing severability, which will receive much
judicial and scholarly attention in light of the wide variety of
statutes that will be affected by the majority's decision. Although Justice Rehnquist did not address the merits of the constitutional issues, he may view the legislative veto as
unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist has twice vocally expressed his preference for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine in order to force Congress to exercise greater control over
administrative agencies. 47 One consequence of invalidating the
legislative veto may be the emergence of narrower congresmight be distinguishable from one- or two-House vetoes. For a suggestion that
there may be no doctrinal distinction between the various types of legislative
vetoes, see infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2796-97 n.11 (White, J., dissenting).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2816-17.
47. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting with Burger, C.J.); Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,

concurring).
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sional delegations to administrative agencies in order to com48
pensate for any perceived loss of congressional control.
3.

Consequences

Although the press immediately pronounced Chadha an
historic decision that shifted the balance of power from Congress to the White House,49 the pronouncement was certainly
premature. The decision may well have no appreciable impact
on the relations between Congress and the President, but even
if it does, it is just as likely to reduce as increase the President's power.
The effect that the decision will have on current statutes
that delegate authority to the Executive subject to a legislative
veto will depend upon how the judiciary makes severability determinations with respect to each of those statutes. Because
the legal standard for determining severability is very solicitous of congressional desires,5 0 it is unlikely that severability
determinations will be made in a way that permits the President to amass power at the expense of Congress.51 If a particular veto provision is held to be nonseverable, the entire
statutory delegation will be invalid, leaving the Executive with
less power than it possessed prior to Chadha. For example, if
Justice Rehnquist's position had prevailed in the Chadha case,
the Attorney General would have been deprived of the authority to suspend deportation in all cases. Even if a veto is held to
be severable, as it was by the majority in Chadha,thereby leaving the underlying statutory delegation in force, Congress retains the power to overrule that judicial determination if it so
desires. In fact, with so many statutes potentially affected by
the Chadha decision, Congress might choose to pass a new
48. Cf.103 S. Ct. at 2795 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) and authorities cited
therein.
49. See, e.g., Supreme Court 7-2, Restricts Congress'sRight to Overrule Actions by Executive Branch, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at Al, col. 6; High Court
Bars Legislative Veto Used by Congress, Wall St. J., June 24, 1983, at 2, col. 2;
Supreme Court Strikes Down 'Legislative Veto'" Hill's Hard-Won Gains of a
Decade Wiped Out Wash. Post, June 24, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Supreme Court
Strikes Down 'Legislative Veto'." Decision Alters Balance of Power in Governmen Wash. Post, June 24, 1983, at Al, col 3; see also The Court Vetoes the Veto,
NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 16; An Epic Court Decision, TME, July 4, 1983, at 12.
Some of the press commentary was more moderate and thoughtful. See, e.g.,
Edley, Congress Will Have to Change Its Ways, Wash. Post, June 26, 1983, at
D8, coL 2; Sundquist, More Confrontation, Stalemate, Deadlock, Wash. Post,
June 26, 1983, at D8, col. 1.
50. See 103 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Court should not
infer grants of power that Congress may not have intended).
51. Arguably, however, this was the effect of Chadha itself. See id.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:47/3

statute declaring which vetoes are severable and which are not,
thereby ensuring that any apparent expansions of executive
power that do result from the Chadha decision are controlled
by Congress itself.52 In fact, if Congress does not take some
such action, an almost certain consequence of Chadha will be
to enhance the ability of private litigants to challenge executive
actions by contesting the severability of veto provisions in the
statutes that authorize the challenged actions.
The effect that Chadha will have on future legislation that
delegates authority to the Executive will depend upon how
badly Congress wishes to control the exercise of executive discretion. If Congress is genuinely apprehensive about unchecked executive discretion, it certainly has the power to
circumscribe that discretion. It need only draft narrower delegations of authority, specifying the ranges of options open to
the Executive in enumerated situations. This is the result advocated by Justice Rehnquist,53 Chief Justice Burger,54 and
many commentators5 5 as a means of restoring the proper structure and operation of the federal government. Whether Congress ultimately chooses to narrow its statutory delegations
will be determined by the level of priority it gives to the need
to control executive discretion.
In the past, Congress has not treated the need to control
executive discretion as a high priority. Since the New Deal,
broad delegations have been the rule rather than the exception,5 6 and in most cases Congress saw no need to qualify its
57
delegations through inclusion of legislative veto provisions.
The modern congressional preoccupation with the legislative
veto 58 may signify a more serious congressional desire to control executive discretion, or it may reflect nothing more than
faddish fascination with the veto device. If recent reliance on
52. If the President were to veto such a statute, Congress would have to
override the veto by a two-thirds vote in order to ensure that it retained control
over the consequences of the Chadha decision.
53. See supra note 48.
54. Id.
55. See authorities cited in Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 n.6 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
56. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 60-61, 84-85; LTumE, supra note 4, at 284-91; cf. THE ADnimsmISATrE PROCESS, supra note 4, at

78-79.
57. Despite the many statutes that have been enacted throughout our history authorizing various Executive actions, only two hundred or so have contained legislative veto provisions, see supra note 9, and only fifty-six remained
in effect when Chadha was decided, id.
58. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

1984]

THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

the legislative veto does signify a serious concern for the control of executive discretion, and there are no other means available for controlling such discretion, one would expect the
apparent unavailability of the legislative veto device to translate that concern into narrower statutory delegations. To the
extent that this occurs, the President will acquire less power as
a result of Chadha, rather than more. To the extent that Congress does not choose to narrow its statutory delegations of authority to the Executive, the Executive may acquire more
power as a result of the Chadha decision. It is difficult to conclude that Chadha will be the harbinger of a significant shift in
governmental power, however, because power will accrue to
the Executive only in those areas where Congress lacks sufficient concern to prevent its accrual.
It may be that a majority of Congress will genuinely desire
to limit executive discretion in a certain area but that no particular substantive limitation will command majority support.
Congress may then be forced to continue making broad delegations to the Executive out of political necessity. Indeed, one of
the most salient consequences of increased congressional reliance on administrative agencies has been reduced congres59
sional involvement in controversial decisionmaking.
Moreover, the fact that broad delegations have frequently been
used in the past without congressional insistence on a legislative veto limitation 60 suggests that Congress may continue to
use such delegations in the future, even though the legislative
veto device will apparently be unavailable. In a sense, this can
be viewed as an expansion of executive power; the Executive
will have the benefit of broad statutory delegations unhampered by a legislative veto, even though if it were politically attainable Congress would prefer a narrower grant of
discretion. Viewed from a different perspective, however, the
scope of executive power will not expand at all. Just as before
the Chadha decision, the President will receive only the power
that Congress is willing to grant, and the political inability of
Congress to agree on a narrower delegation will mean simply
that Congress did not desire limited executive discretion
enough to do what was necessary to secure it.61
59. See supra note 47.
60. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
61. If the need to override a presidential veto is assumed, two-thirds of the
members of each House, rather than a mere majority, will be required to ensure congressional control over the allocation of power between Congress and
the Executive.
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If any significant change in the relationship between Congress and the President does result from the Chadha decision,
it is not likely to result from the absence of legislative vetoes in
the political process but, rather, from the absence of threatened
vetoes. Although enactment of legislative veto provisions has
greatly increased in recent years, 62 they have been exercised
only thirty-one times in the last five years. 63 The number of vetoes has been extremely small relative to the large number of
executive actions that are subject to legislative veto provisions. 64 The political potency of the legislative veto, however,
derives not from its exercise, but from its ability to force the
Executive to negotiate with Congress-or more precisely with
the pertinent committees of Congress-concerning contemplated executive actions in order to prevent a threatened
veto. 65 Although Chadha does deprive Congress of one leverage device in its negotiations with the Executive, Congress possesses many other sources of leverage. The legislative veto
may hardly be missed.
Chadha, of course, does nothing to restrict the ability of
Congress to "veto" executive actions through the enactment of
affirmative legislation, and Congress can use the threat of legislative reversal as a source of leverage in its negotiations with
the Executive. Chadha's effect, if any, will be on the degree of
credibility with which a threat of legislative reversal is perceived by the Executive. To some extent, Chadha reduces congressional credibility because it is politically more difficult to
obtain enough votes for affirmative passage of legislation by
both Houses of Congress-especially if two-thirds majorities
62. See An Epic Court Decision, TnmE, July 4, 1983, at 12, 14.
63. See The Court Vetoes the Veto, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 16-17.
64. The relative rarity of occasions on which legislative vetoes have been
exercised can be appreciated when one recalls that a great many executive actions can be taken under a single statute containing a veto provision. For example, in Chadha itself, the one-House veto was exercised in six hardship
cases, but there were 334 other hardship cases before Congress at the same
time in which a veto was not exercised. See 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
65. See Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 678-80 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per
curiam) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), aFd sub. nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977). Because of the committee structure under which Congress operates, when a House of Congress retains the power to exercise a legislative veto,
the pertinent committees and committee chairpersons effectively wield
whatever power derives from the legislative veto. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
supra note 4, at 96-97; see also Edley, supra note 49, at D8, col. 2. The power of
committees is illustrated by the facts of Chadha, where the House of Representatives was willing to give the Immigration Subcommittee its way, at the behest of the Subcommittee Chairperson, w-ith virtually no explanation
whatsoever of why the Subcommittee wished to deport Mr. Chadha. See supra
note 5.
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will be necessary to override a presidential veto-than it is to
obtain the votes needed to exercise a legislative veto. Congress
can, however, take some steps to enhance its credibility. The
easiest of these is simply to make a threat of legislative reversal and to carry through on that threat. Although it might ordinarily be difficult for Congress to coalesce around the merits of
a particular bill to reverse a particular executive action, it may
be considerably easier to obtain the votes in a "test case"
designed to establish congressional credibility for future negotiations with the Executive. If the first legislative reversal does
not establish the desired negotiating tone, Congress can reverse a second executive proposal, and then a third, until the
desired degree of congressional credibility is established. Congress can facilitate this process through the use of "laying
over" provisions added to executive enabling legislation, which
would delay the effectiveness of executive actions for specified
periods of time until Congress has had an opportunity to consider proposals for legislative reversal, 66 thereby further increasing congressional credibility.
If Congress, in fact, lacks the political cohesiveness to implement the "test case" strategy, it can bind itself in a way that
automatically bolsters its credibility through enactment of
"sunset" provisions under which executive actions, and the authorizations on which they depend, automatically expire after
specified periods of time subject to congressional renewal. 67 If
the Executive knows that it will periodically have to persuade
Congress to enact new legislation extending executive authority, the Executive is likely to be quite sympathetic to congressional desires during negotiations between the two.
Congress can also affect the balance of negotiating power
through its appropriations authority.68 In a general sense, Congress can coerce executive agencies into deferring to congressional desires by threatening unfavorable appropriations for
noncooperative agencies in subsequent years. If threats of general budgetary reductions are not sufficient to obtain the desired deference, Congress can use the threat of riders and
reauthorization provisions precluding expenditures for particular executive actions in much the same way that it was able to
66. The constitutionality of such "laying over" provisions was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941). But see 103 S. Ct.
at 2795-96 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "laying over" procedure
is inadequate substitute for legislative veto).
67. See S. BREYER & IL STEWART, supra note 4, at 146-47.
68. See id. at 147-48.
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use the threat of a legislative veto prior to Chadha. As a practical matter, the use of such techniques can be more difficult
when it is Congress that desires a particular action and the Executive that disapproves.
The congressional strategies discussed thus far require the
concurrence of both Houses of Congress and two-thirds majorities in each House if they prompt a presidential veto. Realistically, such concurrence is far from unattainable, because the
actions of a House of Congress will be largely dependent upon
the actions of controlling committees. 69 This is especially true
with respect to appropriations, but it also applies to routine legislative activity. Nevertheless, if the concurrence of both
Houses of Congress is deemed too unwieldy to prompt executive deference to Congress during negotiations, a single congressional committee can generate significant pressure on an
executive agency contemplating particular actions by scheduling oversight hearings. 70 Oversight hearings not only ensure
that executive agencies are apprised of congressional views
about contemplated executive actions, but the publicity that
they generate may affect popular support for particular proposed actions. Although agencies are often characterized as
being beyond political accountability,71 the President, who is
identified with agency positions, certainly is not. In addition,
oversight hearings can affect the ability of executive actions to
survive the judicial review that inevitably follows those actions
by calling into question the degree to which the Executive has
complied with the congressional intent behind the enabling legislation.7 2 Oversight hearings also provide an ideal opportunity
for Congress to make those threats outlined above.
Finally, Congress or some portion thereof can simply veto a
contemplated executive action of which it disapproves. Under
Chadha, such legislative vetoes do not have binding legal ef69. See supra note 65.
70. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 145.
71. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting); see also S. BREYER &
R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 103-04.
72. Judicial review of administrative agency actions is now commonplace
and an accepted method of constraining agency discretion. See S. BREYER & R.
STEwART, supra note 4, at 162-64. To the extent that congressional committees
can persuasively suggest through oversight hearings that a particular executive
action does not accord with the intent of Congress in authorizing the agency to
act, that executive action is less likely to survive judicial review, because reviewing courts typically must set aside executive actions exceeding the scope
of the Executive's statutory authorization. See Administrative Procedure Act
§ 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C) (1982).
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fect, but their political effect is not eliminated by the decision. 73
An executive agency contemplating a particular action is not
likely to simply ignore a "veto" of that action by its oversight
committee, let alone a "veto" by one or both Houses of
Congress. 74
If the political ramifications of the Chadha decision are uncertain, so are its policy implications. Policy opposition to the
legislative veto was premised on the belief that elimination of
the veto would improve the quality of governmental decisionmaking by precluding politically-motivated reversals, at the behest of special interest lobbies, of decisions made on the merits
by expert agency decisionmakers.7 5 To the extent that Congress possesses alternate means of influencing agency decisionmaking, the special interest lobbyists still have reason to direct
their energies to congressional targets. Moreover, the initial
policy premise may have been incorrect. Special interest lobbyists certainly know how to "work" the agencies as well as the
Hill. This is evidenced by the fact that agencies are as frequently criticized for being "captured" as they are for being independent and unaccountable. 76 In addition, this view
presupposes a difference between decisions made on the "merits" and political decisions; if such a difference does exist, it is
77
not certain which type of decision is preferable.
In fairness, the policy assertion on which support for the
legislative veto was premised is equally uncertain. The proposition that agency accountability would be enhanced by virtue
of the legislative veto is less than obvious. Because much congressional power is vested in committees and committee heads,
who are the ones likely to have benefited from any increase in
bargaining power that the legislative veto had to offer,78 it may
73. Lloyd Cutler, former White House Counsel to President Carter, was
quoted as making this point. See Impact of Court's Ruling on Congress, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1983, at B4, col. 4.
74. The Senate could also elicit promises of responsiveness to congressional committees at the confirmation hearings of executive officials, although
it is difficult to imagine how those promises could be enforced.
If Congress genuinely believed that the legislative veto was indispensable,
it could initiate the process of amending the Constitution to permit the veto device-a process in which the Executive plays no role. See U.S. CONST., art. V.
75. See supra note 12.
76. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 4,at 106-21.
77. Unless one is prepared to adopt the view that particular outcomes are
correct or incorrect in some absolute sense, the logrolling inherent in the political process may be as good a basis as any for distinguishing between correct
and incorrect outcomes in relative terms.
78. See supra note 65.
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primarily have been accountability to those individuals rather
than to a more representative House of Congress that would
have been fostered by the legislative veto. It is far from clear
that such diluted accountability to the voters would have been
any more effective than the derivative accountability to which
agencies are presently subject by virtue of their identification
with the President. Moreover, the role that campaign contributions and the like would play in shaping final agency decisions
is probably equivalent under either scheme.
Despite the fancy arguments that can be made suggesting
that Chadha may have little or no effect on the government
decisionmaking process, it is nevertheless tempting to oversimplify. Before Chadha, Congress had the power to overrule an
executive action by majority vote in one House of Congress,
and after the decision it would take majority votes in both
Houses plus presidential concurrence, or two-thirds majority
votes in each House, to do the same thing. This would at first
appear to constitute a reduction in congressional power, with a
concomitant increase in the power of the President. Closer
analysis, however, reveals that it is not. Chadha does not effect
a reduction in the power of Congress because the legislative
veto is not a legislative veto. It is a veto by some entity less
than and different from the legislature operating in accordance
with the prescribed legislative process. The reason that the
legislative veto is appealing to its proponents is precisely because its efficiency permits the accomplishment of something
that the legislature itself is politically unable to accomplish.
The legislature by definition lacks the votes needed to negate
the executive action at issue, otherwise it would simply enact
affirmative legislation accomplishing the same result-by twothirds votes if necessary to override a presidential veto. Even
in cases where use of the full legislative process might be politically possible, it may be simply too expensive in terms of diversion of legislative resources to warrant its use: the
legislature would still be politically unable to negate the subject executive action by affirmative vote and yet accomplish all
of the other political tasks that it deemed worthy of its attention. If this were not the case, there would have been no need
for Congress to have provided for a legislative veto in the first
place. Once the legislative veto is recognized as a device for
taking actions that the legislature itself could never take, the
interesting question becomes whether the Constitution permits
such an anomaly to be incorporated into our form of govern-
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ment. The answer is that legal analysis, as we now know it, is
incapable of providing a satisfactory answer.
B. AN ANALYSIS
Three of the opinions in Chadha discuss the constitutionality of the legislative veto, but each is analytically defective in
some respect. Arguments other than those relied upon by the
Justices can also be made both for and against the validity of
the veto, but those arguments are flawed as well. All of the arguments are flawed in that they fail to provide a logical, nonsubjective means of determining the constitutionality of the
legislative veto without generating intolerable inconsistencies
in the process. As a result, it is not possible to adopt a position
on the constitutionality of the veto without succumbing to the
subjective preferences and personal predilections from which
doctrinal analysis was intended to save us. As far as the legislative veto is concerned, the pertinent doctrines are too indeterminate to be of much help.

1. The Majority Opinion
The problem with the majority opinion is that it fails to establish the predicate on which its constitutional analysis depends. Assuming that Chief Justice Burger is correct in his
assertion that legislation can constitutionally result only from
the bicameralism and presentment processes prescribed in article 1,79 his opinion never adequately explains why the exercise of a veto should be viewed as "legislation." If a legislative
veto is not a law, the article I procedures are not violated because they simply do not apply.
The only justification that the majority offers for characterizing a veto as a law is that a veto has "the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons...
outside the legislative branch"8 0 through "determinations of
policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral
passage followed by presentment to the President."8 ' The government frequently implements policies, however, that alter legal rights without adhering to the article I procedures. Every
day, presidential executive orders, agency rulings, and judicial
decisions are issued with the express intent of altering legal
rights and implementing policies. Despite their noncompliance
79. 103 S. CL at 2782-84.
80. Id. at 2784.
81. Id. at 2786.
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with article I, however, such actions are nevertheless recognized as constitutional. The Chief Justice concedes that executive actions, such as administrative agency rulemaking, may
"resemble" lawmaking, but rather than distinguishing those actions from the legislative veto, he merely asserts that they are
82
executive rather than legislative in nature.
The justification on which the majority opinion relies to
support this characterization of executive actions stems from
the nondelegation doctrine. 83 What would otherwise be lawmaking becomes an executive rather than a legislative function
when it occurs within the confines of the statutory standards
prescribed by the authorizing legislation. Because the executive branch is implementing the statutory standard, it is administering the statute rather than making new law.84 If this
were not the case-if the statutory standards were broad
enough to permit actual lawmaking under the guise of executive administration of the statute-the authorizing legislation
would be invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
The problem with this justification is, of course, that at the
federal level the nondelegation doctrine is merely a fiction that
no longer has any substantive content. 85 It has repeatedly been
construed to tolerate the broadest delegations imaginable, leaving ample latitude for the Executive to engage in actual lawmaking.86 By relying on the nondelegation fiction to sound the
distinction between executive and legislative activity, the ma82. Id. at 2785 n.16.
83. Id. See also infra note 85.
84. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
85. The nondelegation doctrine theoretically precludes Congress from delegating legislative power to another branch of government or to a private entity. Certain legal fictions have been created, however, to permit the Executive
to engage in activities that closely resemble lawmaking under broad statutory
grants of authority. Primary among these is the fiction that the Executive operates within the confines of a standard set by Congress. See THE ADMNmISTRATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 44-78.
86. See, e.g., statutes discussed in S. BREYER & 1R STEWART, supra note 4, at
60-61, 84-85. Some judicial decisions have suggested that standards developed
by the Executive or standards imposed by the judiciary to constrain executive
discretion can "save" overbroad congressional delegations. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-62 (D.D.C. 1971) (threejudge court) (upholding statute authorizing President to impose wage and
price controls in President's discretion). Although that theory demonstrates
sensitivity to the abuses that can result when lawmaking and law-applying
powers are concentrated in the Executive branch, it is unresponsive to the concern that legislative policy decisions should be made by Congress. At best, that
theory still enables the Executive or the judiciary to engage in "lawmaking"
without regard to the article I procedures.
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jority is simply asking us to pretend that the Executive does
not engage in actual lawmaking, rather than proving that proposition. Moreover, the majority's failure to distinguish the legislative veto from the other types of governmental policy
enactments that alter legal rights leaves us with no viable definition of legislative activity to which article I procedures apply.
If an agency rule or a judicial determination can alter legal
rights without adhering to article I procedures, it is difficult to
see why a legislative veto cannot do so as well.
It might be argued that, regardless of what other branches
do, whenever Congress takes a policy action that alters legal
rights, that action must comply with the article I legislative procedures. After all, unlike the other branches, which derive
their power from different parts of the Constitution, the only
power that Congress possesses is article I legislative power,
and legislative power must be exercised in accordance with the
constitutionally prescribed legislative procedures. The problem
with this argument is that Congress, like the other branches,
regularly alters legal rights without adhering to article I procedures and those actions are thought to be constitutional. This
is true in matters as mundane as a congressional committee's
contractual commitment to reimburse a witness for airplane
fare expended in order to testify at legislative hearings, to matters as significant as issuing a congressional subpoena or holding a witness in contempt of Congress for refusing to provide
requested information. 87 When the House of Representatives
cited Ann Burford, head of the Environmental Protection
Agency, for contempt after she refused to provide requested
documents,8 8 the Senate was not required to concur and the
President was not given an opportunity to veto the contempt citation. Nevertheless, few would suggest that the contempt citation was unconstitutional for failure to comply with article I
legislative procedures, even though the House of Representatives' action altered the legal rights of someone outside the legislative branch. Such actions are authorized as incident to
87. Although Congress now typically refers contempt cases to the Department of Justice and the courts, the Supreme Court has held that each House of
Congress has the implied power to punish contempts as an incident to its legislative authority without the participation of the other House or the other
branches of government. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). See
generally P. FREuND, A. SuTHSRLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CoNsTrrunoNAL
LAW 677-79 (1977).
88. See House Charges Head of E.P.A. with Contempt, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1982, at Al, col. 5.
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Congress's legislative power,8 9 and the majority opinion never
explains why a legislative veto cannot similarly be viewed as
an incident to legislative power.
A more serious justification for permitting the Executive
but not Congress to alter legal rights without insisting on the
safeguards of bicameralism and presentment is that executive
actions, unlike legislative actions, are subject to judicial review,
thereby providing a substitute for the article I safeguards. Because the protection of judicial review is not present after a legislative veto is exercised, 90 the political protections of
bicameralism and presentment become particularly important.
The majority opinion flirts with this justification, but does not
develop it fully.9 ' Even fully developed, however, this argument is flawed. The article I bicameralism and presentment
procedures are not designed to guard against the same dangers
that judicial review is designed to prevent. Judicial review is
designed to prevent the sacrifice of individual rights to the
desires of the majority, because a single individual is politically
92
powerless to hold the majority accountable for its actions.
To the extent that this abuse of individual rights was present in Chadha, it provided a basis for invalidating the legislative veto exercised in that case as an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.93 Although Justice Powell was willing to invalidate
the veto on grounds that resemble bill of attainder grounds, 94
the majority was not. 95 By insisting on article I procedural
grounds as the basis for its invalidation, the majority deprived
itself of the ability to rely intelligibly on the unsettling arbitrariness that admittedly colors the veto exercised in Chadha.96
The bicameralism and presentment procedures that were held
to have been violated in Chadha were simply not designed to
89. See supra note 87.
90. See 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring); see also infra notes 120-27
and accompanying text.
91. See 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
92. See id. at 2791-92 (Powell, J., concurring); see also L. TRIBE, supra note
4, at 474-77, 491-99; Spann, supra note 2, at 597-602; Wright, ProfessorBickel, the
Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 Hv. L. REV. 769, 787-89 (1971);
Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the
Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962); see generally J. ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDicmi. REVIEW (1980).

93.
to the
text.
94.
95.
96.

Note that due process protections do not apply in any meaningful way
targets of legislative vetoes. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying
See 103 S. Ct. at 2789-90 (Powell, J., concurring).
See id. at 2785 n.17.
See supra note 5.
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guard against arbitrary or capricious legislative actions. The
legislature can be as arbitrary and capricious as it desires without offending articleI procedures as long as it does so with the
concurrence of the three separate constituencies represented
in the legislative process.9 7 Because Mr. Chadha himself is not
among those constituencies, the article I procedures are not
designed to protect his personal interests. At best, the majority
could argue that its decision based on article I was coincidentally correct because it happened to correct an abuse that another, technically unavailable constitutional provision-the bill
of attainder clause-was designed to prevent. But that sort of
"rough justice" is far from principled decisionmaking.
A staunch defender of the majority opinion, frustrated by
the use of what some would term doctrinal niceties to chip
away at the majority's reasoning, might ask what a legislative
veto is, if not an inchoate law. Leaving aside the observation
that believers in principled decisionmaking cannot simply
shrug off doctrinal inconsistencies by shifting the burden of
proof, it is possible to categorize a legislative veto without
terming it a "law." A legislative veto is a contingency on which
the effectiveness of the underlying congressional authorization
depends. Just as Congress could make supplemental unemployment benefits contingent on unemployment reaching a certain rate, or disaster relief contingent on a presidential
declaration of emergency, Congress could also make congressional authorization of a contemplated executive action contingent on the absence of a legislative veto. In this regard, a veto
provision contained in a statute is no different than an expiration date contained in a statute. Both are agreed to by the enacting Congress in accordance with the prescribed article I
procedures, both supplant legal rights claimed under the statute once they occur, and both have legal effect without further
action by Congress. 98
97. See supra note 92; infra text accompanying note 194.
98. Note that this embodies a positivist view of law under which individuals possess only those rights granted them by their government. This is a view
that the Supreme Court appears to have embraced. See Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (for federal due process purposes, individuals possess
only those property interests granted by the government); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976) (same with respect to liberty interests). One consequence
of adopting this view is that it deprives individuals of meaningful procedural
due process rights when the legislature has failed to create a substantive property or liberty right, as it arguably has failed to do with respect to those at
whom a legislative veto is directed. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying
text.
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The only sensible basis for distinguishing traditionally accepted contingencies from the legislative veto contingency is
that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the veto contingency is
within the control of Congress, whereas other customary contingencies are not. That is relevant because, if Congress both
authorizes executive action and then vetoes particular executive proposals under that authorization, the same branch of
government is both formulating and controlling the ultimate
application of policy in a way that violates separation of powers
principles. 9 9
Although ultimately unpersuasive, as is discussed further
below, this is a serious argument. It is an argument, however,
that is unavailable to the majority. The majority, by insisting
on the nondelegation fiction,OO which permits administrative
agencies to circumvent the constitutional separation of policymaking and policy-application functions to a greater degree
than is possible under a legislative veto scheme, estops itself
from relying on separation of powers principles to distinguish
the legislative veto from any other contingency. Because there
is no acceptable way to distinguish the legislative veto from
other legislative contingencies, it is unclear why the majority
did not simply view the legislative veto as a valid contingency
rather than an unconstitutional "law."
Legal analysis is more likely to be persuasive if it is shown
to advance some generally agreed-upon policy objective than if
it appears to be simply a hollow application of a legal rule.101
Accordingly, the majority's reasoning would be easier to accept
if the article I defects upon which it is based could be shown to
further some purpose intended to be served by the legislative
procedures specified in article I. Those procedures are generally understood as efforts to ensure that each of the three constituencies with which the Framers were concerned have
adequate input into all legislative decisions,102 thereby permitting only those legislative proposals that satisfy some minimal
level of quality or acceptability to become law.
The majority fails to explain why that objective is not fully
99. See Spann, supra note 2, at 593-94, see also S. BREYER & P. STEWART,
supra note 4, at 37-39; L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 474-77, 491-99.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
101. See Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain Error Rule, 71 GEO. L.J.
945, 979-82 (1983). The present article goes a step further than that article by
suggesting that even functional analysis is ultimately flawed. But see id. at 98889 (conceding as much).
102. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.

THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

19841

realized under a legislative veto scheme. Each of the pertinent
constituencies has necessarily agreed to enactment of every
legislative veto provision. Even when the representative of one
of the constituencies, say the President, has never actually
agreed to a veto provision but rather is bound by the actions of
a predecessor in office, the constituency itself is nevertheless
deemed to have consented. All statutes are binding on successor Congresses and administrations until they expire or until
they are modified or repealed. Legislative veto provisions are
no exception. It is not sufficient to simply assert that the legislative veto changes the constitutionally prescribed procedure
by which laws are enacted, 0 3 or that it circumvents the constitutional amendment process. 0 4 Such arguments simply beg
the question of whether the veto is constitutional-of whether
its exercise constitutes "enactment" of a "law." The majority
opinion is unacceptably flawed precisely because it does nothing to resolve that question.
2. Justice Powell's Concurrence
The problem with Justice Powell's opinion is that it ignores
the logical implications of its own assertions. By viewing legislative vetoes directed at individuals as usurpations of judicial
power, 05 Justice Powell is forced to rely on a model of the judicial function so broad that it envelops many actions that are
typically thought to constitute proper exercises of congressional power.
Justice Powell characterizes the legislative veto exercised
in Chadha as a statutory interpretation of the hardship provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and an application
of that provision to the facts of the Chadha case--something he
deems to be a judicial function. 0 6 As an initial matter, it is
doctrinally unclear why Justice Powell believes that his theory
of the case is any narrower than the theory relied upon by the
majority. Although Justice Powell suggests that invalidating
the veto in the context of adjudications would not, under his
theory, necessarily invalidate them in the context of rulemaking,'0 7 the degree to which Congress would be engaged in statu103.
2785.
104.

That is the position adopted by the majority in Chadha. 103 S. Ct. at
See U.S.

CONST., art. V

(prescribing process for amending

Constitution).
105.
106.
107.

103 S. Ct. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 2790-92.
Id. at 2789, 2792.
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tory interpretation would be the same whether rulemaking or
adjudication were involved. If, instead of vetoing the suspension of Mr. Chadha's deportation, the House of Representatives
had vetoed a regulation suspending on hardship grounds the
deportation of all aliens who sincerely wished to remain in the
United States, the House of Representatives would have been
at least as guilty of construing the statutory hardship provision
as it was in the Chadha case itself. Accordingly, Justice Powell
should find both actions unconstitutional.108 In either situation,
however, Justice Powell's characterization of the veto is merely
conclusory, and it probably does not accurately describe what
the House of Representatives was doing.
Although the Immigration Subcommittee spoke in terms of
applying the statutory hardship criteria when it proposed to
veto the suspension of Mr. Chadha's deportation,10 9 it is unlikely that the Subcommittee or the full House of Representatives had any serious concern for the actual intent of Congress
in enacting the hardship provision, as a reviewing court necessarily would have had. What is more likely is that the Inmigration Subcommittee simply wished to exercise its veto power
periodically in order to avoid atrophy of its political potency
and to remind the Immigration and Naturalization Service that
Congress was looking over the agency's shoulder.11o Mr.
Chadha may well have been nothing more than a victim of circumstances. Viewed in this light, the Chadha veto does not
readily lend itself to characterization as "judicial activity;" the
judicial function does not include the exploitation of individual
rights for the purpose of sending messages to other branches of
government.1 11
108. There is an additional problem of drawing a meaningful distinction between rulemaking and adjudication. When an action appears to be general and
legislative in nature, but affects only a small number of people, or affects a
large number of people such as aliens who do not have the right to vote and
are, therefore, politically powerless before the legislature, should that action be
categorized as legislative rulemaking or as a judicial function? These are
problems that complicate analysis under the bill of attainder and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. See supra note 92; see also infra notes 120-27
and accompanying text.
109. See 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
110. This view is supported by the Immigration Subcommittee's failure to
cite any particular reasons for overruling the Attorney General's hardship determinations in the six out of the 340 cases in which it acted; by the fact that
deporting Chadha would apparently have entailed a genuine hardship; and by
the fact that the Immigration Subcommittee took similar action in six other
cases the preceding year. See supra note 5.
111. It may well be, however, that the essence of the judicial function consists of using individual cases as opportunities to make pronouncements of law,
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Even if the House of Representatives actually disagreed
with the Attorney General's application of the statutory criteria
when it vetoed the suspension of Chadha's deportation, that
does not establish that the veto was a judicial act. It can just as
easily be viewed as the final act in the legislative process. Because the veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act
reserves the right of Congress to finalize the statute's meaning
at a later date, the very meaning of the statute is dependent
upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a legislative veto.
The veto, therefore, does not constitute an interpretation of the
statute. Rather, it is the referent through which the statute's
meaning can be ascertained. For example, if the amount of
benefits payable to an individual under a statutory program is
tied to the inflation rate, the inflation rate is something that
gives the statute meaning in particular contexts, not something
that interprets the statute. This is another version of the contingency argument discussed above. 112 Although subject to certain objections, as is explained below, 1 13 this argument
nevertheless is an impediment to viewing the legislative veto as
an act of statutory interpretation.14
As Justice Powell points out, separation of powers principles are offended not only by one branch's usurpation of powers vested in another branch, but also by one branch's
impermissible interference with another's performance of its
constitutionally assigned functions.1 5 The legislative veto exercised by the House of Representatives appears to have complicated Mr. Chadha's life in a way that was arbitrary, if not
capricious. 11 6 Accordingly, one might argue that the legislative
veto exercised in Chadha was unconstitutional because, if not
struck down, it would have prevented the judiciary from protecting Chadha's rights from arbitrary governmental abrogaespecially at the Supreme Court level. This is the suggestion advanced in
Spann, supra note 2, at 592-617.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
114. The majority objects to Justice Powell's characterization of the legislative veto as judicial in nature on case-or-controversy grounds. See 103 S. Ct. at
2787 n.21. Justice Powell points out that this objection is very artificial, see id.
at 2791 n.8 (Powell, J., concurring), and in so doing makes the majority's argument seem silly. Moreover, the majority itself showed little sensitivity to caseor-controversy concerns when it summarily disposed of the mootness issue
raised by Chadha's marriage to an American citizen. See supra note 14. For a
critical discussion of the Supreme Court's development of case-or-controversy
law, as well as a suggestion that the issuance of "advisory" opinions constitutes
the essence of the federal judiciary function, see generally Spann, supra note 2.
115. See 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. See supra note 5.
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tion-a function constitutionally assigned to the judiciary. This
argument, however, highlights the central weakness in Justice
Powell's position.
To the extent that the legislative veto precludes meaningful
judicial review of Chadha's plight, it is only unconstitutional if
1 17
Congress has impermissibly precluded judicial review.
Under a legislative veto scheme, the judiciary is not precluded
from reviewing whether a legislative veto was in fact exercised,
whether its exercise was authorized by statute, whether its exercise was procedurally proper, or other similar questions. The
veto scheme does, however, preclude judicial inquiry into the
merits of a congressional decision to exercise a legislative veto;
the courts cannot set aside a veto because it is imprudent, arbitrary, or even capricious. Congress can constitutionally preclude judicial review in this manner as long as it does not run
1 8
afoul of any constitutional limitation on congressional power. '
In the Chadha context, there are two potential limitations on
congressional power that are interrelated. First, the legislative
veto scheme that had the ultimate effect of depriving Mr.
Chadha of any opportunity for judicial review of the arbitrariness to which he was subjected might deprive him of his due
process rights. Second, the legislative veto scheme resulting in
the suspension of Chadha's deportation might amount to an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. 1 19 Ultimately, however,
neither theory is sufficient to invalidate the legislative veto.
Although the arbitrary manner in which Chadha's deportation was ordered tends to offend one's intuitive sense of due
process, 2 0 it does not amount to a due process violation. If an
executive agency had ordered Chadha deported for no appar117. Article ]II gives Congress the nominal power to regulate the jurisdiction of all federal courts, other than the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. U.S. CONST., art. II. Although few would argue that article III actually
gives Congress unlimited power to regulate such federal jurisdiction, there is
serious uncertainty concerning the precise limits on congressional power in
D. SHAimo & H. WECHSLER,
this regard. See generally P. BATOn, P. MisHmc,
HART AND WECHsLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].

309-75

118. See generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof
the Federal Courts: An Exericse in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L REV. 1362 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER supra note 117, at 330-60. A more recent discussion of the limits on congressional power to regulate federal court jurisdiction
is contained in Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, Forward: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981).
119. To the extent that equal protection concerns might be implicated, they
raise problems relevant to a bill of attainder analysis. See infra note 127.
120. See supra note 5.
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ent reason, with no findings or record, Chada's due process
rights might well have been violated.121 Chadha, however, has
no due process rights against Congress that would benefit him.
Any due process rights Chadha might possess would necessarily be limited to procedural rights because the Supreme Court
has rejected the suggestion that individuals possess a substan22
tive due process right to fair treatment by the government.1
Rather, because the accountability to which Congress is subject is primarily political in nature, individuals possess only the
right to be free from unauthorized governmental action. The
due process clause is only relevant to the extent that it
prescribes the procedures by which governmental authorization must be established. But, assuming that a congressional
decision to deport Chadha does not violate any specific limita123
or
tion on congressional power, such as the first amendment
24
as
authorized
is
deportation
the equal protection clause,1 the
deportaa
pass
to
Congress
long as there are enough votes in
tion statute. Because, as a practical matter, there will be no
dispute as to the number of votes, Chadha has no meaningful
due process rights.125
121. To the extent that a statute, such as the Immigration and Nationality
Act, grants Chadha an "entitlement" to remain in the United States under
specified conditions, he has a procedural due process right to an adequate determination of whether the specified conditions exist. This is because the statutory -entitlement creates a property interest to which federal due process
protections attach. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
122. This seems to be the gist of Roth, which precludes the existence of any
federal due process protections in the absence of a government-created entitlement. See 408 U.S. at 569-78. Note, however, that entitlements can exist as a de
facto matter, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972), although it
appears that the government has substantial power to preclude the existence
of de facto entitlements that one might intuitively believe to exist. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347-50 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 15155 (1974) (plurality opinion by Rehnquist, J.). As noted above, see supra note
98, these cases implement a positivist view of law. For suggestions that due
process protections should be rooted in substantive rights that are of a more
inherent nature, see Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestionfor the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 261, 273-86; Val Alstyne, Cracks
in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 470-84 (1977).
123. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
124. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
125. At times, procedural due process protections may be completely inapplicable to Congress. In Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 503-04 (1972), the
Supreme Court suggested that when circumstances so demanded, a legislature
could immediately punish contempt without according any procedural safeguards. An alternate explanation of the Court's statement in Groppi, however,
might be that due process protections always apply to Congress but in some
circumstances no process is "due." Such an outcome is apparently possible.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977) (although due process ap-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:473

Such limited due process protection is tolerable with respect to congressional actions only because of the full due process safeguards available when congressional actions are
applied by the executive branch to particular individuals.126 If
Congress were itself to attempt to apply legislative policies to
individuals, circumventing the separation of legislative and executive powers, it might be enacting an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.12 7 Therefore, arbitrary governmental action is prevented either through the due process clause or the bill of attainder provision, depending on the stage at which the
arbitrariness enters the governmental process.
Because the arbitrariness entered Mr. Chadha's case at the
legislative stage of the governmental process,128 due process is
inapplicable. For the veto exercised in Chadha's case to be
found unconstitutionally arbitrary, it must be found to violate
the bill of attainder provision. Indeed, that is precisely the
thrust of Justice Powell's argument. Because the legislative
veto permitted Congress alone to act upon the status of Mr.
Chadha, without the stage of executive implementation to
which judicial review and due process protections could attach,
he was deprived of the constitutional protection from arbitrary
and capricious governmental action inherent in separation of
powers. 129 Justice Powell chose to frame his objection in terms
of usurping judicial functions rather than in bill of attainder
terms 130 because the veto scheme utilized in Chadha could not,
doctrinally, be a bill of attainder.
One reason the legislative veto itself could not be a bill of
plied to infliction of corporal punishment in public schools, virtually no procedural protections were "due").
126. Compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (finding due
process right to hearing before tax is assessed against property owned by specific individuals) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239
U.S. 441 (1915) (finding no due process right to hearing before increase in property tax valuation generally applicable throughout jurisdiction).
127. Congress is constitutionally prohibited from enacting any bill of attainder. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A bill of attainder is a legislative enactment,
directed at a particular individual or group, which inflicts punishment on that
individual or group without a judicial trial in a manner that is inconsistent with
the safeguards of separation of powers. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 315-16 (1946); see also Note, supra note 92, at 343-60. The bill of attainder
provision is best understood as protecting from legislative abrogation the rights
of those who have insufficient political power to participate meaningfully in the
legislative process. In this regard, the bill of attainder clause is similar to at
least one aspect of the equal protection clause, which is also aimed at protecting politically powerless groups. See generally J. ELY, supra note 92, at 135-79.
128. See supra note 5.
129. See 103 S. Ct. at 2789-90 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 2789-92.
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attainder was because it was not a duly enacted law, as the majority opinion points out; it was simply an action of one House
of Congress. 3 1 Moreover, even if the underlying statute is
viewed as the pertinent law, whose meaning is finalized
through exercise of the legislative veto,132 it still cannot amount
to a bill of attainder. The bill of attainder prohibition in the
Constitution has been limited to proscribing only punitive acts
by Congress,133 thereby avoiding unwarranted interference
with congressional power to enact narrow legislation and special bills in nonpunitive areas. Deportation, however, has been
held to be nonpunitive, 34 indicating that judicial prohibition of
narrow immigration legislation would constitute an unwarranted limitation on congressional power. 35 Accordingly, Justice Powell is doctrinally unable to save Mr. Chadha, who has
fallen through the crack between the due process and bill of attainder protections of the Constitution. In order to save him,
Justice Powell would have to reject either the principle that
there is no substantive due process right to governmental fairness' 36 or the principle that deportation is not punishment to
which the bill of attainder prohibition applies. 137 Because one
of those principles must be rejected in order to invalidate the
legislative veto on the grounds suggested by Justice Powell, his
position is doctrinally unacceptable. 3 8
The flaw in Justice Powell's position can be illustrated even
more graphically. It is true that Congress's decision to deport
131. See id. at 2784-87.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
133. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946).
134. See cases cited in Note, supra note 92, at 356 n.142.
135. The cases that construed deportation not to constitute punishment for
bill of attainder, or closely related ex postfacto purposes, see supra note 134,
apparently did so in order to prevent unwarranted judicial interference with
congressional power to formulate legislative policy, such as the policy for dealing with perceived Communist threats to American national security. See, e.g.,
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529-31 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594-95 (1952). This is a construction with which a then-student commentator disagreed. See Note, supra note 92, at 360-61.
136. See supra note 122.
137. See supra note 134.
138. It might be argued that any legislative scheme that permitted Chadha
to be deported without political or judicial protection is unconstitutional because the entire scheme violates Chadha's due process rights. This argument,
however, amounts to nothing more than a reformulated challenge to the
Court's determination that deportation is not punishment for bill of attainder
purposes. The Court apparently so construed deportation in order to preserve
a certain degree of latitude for Congress in dealing with aliens. Acceptance of a
reformulated due process argument would frustrate that objective in the same
way that it would have been frustrated by a contrary ruling on the punishment
issue.
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Mr. Chadha without permitting either the Executive or the judiciary to participate meaningfully in that decision undermined
separation of powers principles. It is also true that a single individual such as Chadha typically has no political power with
which to influence a legislative decision, thereby making it theoretically sensible to insist that individuals about to be subjected to legislative actions be given access to a judicial forum,
which is institutionally competent to take account of their individual interests.1 39 We have, however, nothing more than a
rhetorical belief in separation of powers. Though we routinely
permit Congress to violate separation of powers principles
when it enacts private bills, Justice Powell never adequately
explains why the breakdown in separation of powers is tolerable in those cases but not in Chadha's case. If Chadha were admitted into the United States by private bill, Justice Powell
would not be offended,140 but the abrogation of separation of
powers would be precisely the same as if he were excluded by
private bill. In both cases Congress would have made and implemented policy without the concurrence or participation of
the other branches of government, especially if the private bill
were enacted over the President's veto.
The only distinction offered by Justice Powell rests on the
illusory difference between rights and benefits. He argues that
although Congress cannot disadvantage individuals in derogation of separation of powers, it can confer a benefit without regard to separation of powers restrictions because the dangers
of arbitrary action are not present when a mere benefit is conferred.141 That, however, is simply not the case. If Mr. Chadha
is arbitrarily admitted into the country, he may benefit, but the
individual who would otherwise have had his place in college,
and the individual who would otherwise have had his place in
graduate school, and the individual who would otherwise have
had his job, will all be disadvantaged.142 Moreover, each disadvantaged individual is as politically powerless to influence the
legislative decision admitting Mr. Chadha into the United
139. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
140. See 103 S. Ct. at 2792 n.9.
141. See id.
142. It might be argued that such individuals would not have standing to
complain about the ways in which they were disadvantaged by the admission
of a third party into the United States pursuant to a procedure that violated
separation of powers principles. However, that merely begs the question. It
does not explain why we should not be concerned with the full scope of injuries that accompany congressional acts taken in violation of separation of powers principles.
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States as Mr. Chadha would be to influence a legislative decision to deport him. It is, therefore, unclear why separation of
powers concerns are not squarely implicated. Justice Powell
cannot satisfactorily explain when the doctrine of separation of
powers applies and when it does not because the doctrine itself
is too indeterminate to permit an intelligible distinction to be
drawn. Without such a distinction, however, we cannot be sure
that Justice Powell's suggested resolution of Chadha is anything other than a product of his personal predilections. His
position is thus doctrinally flawed.
3. Justice White's Dissent
The arguments made by Justice White in dissent, maintaining that the legislative veto is constitutional, vary in their degree of seriousness. Some are simply the hollow products of
doctrinal manipulations so transparent that it is hard to imagine that even Justice White takes them seriously. Other arguments are better, and one is quite powerful. Even the best
argument, however, ultimately succumbs to a legal fiction that
cannot be abandoned without intolerable costs, thereby rendering Justice White's position doctrinally unavailable. In fact, the
manner in which Justice White subordinates the doctrinal arguments to his subjective preferences concerning the policies
implicated by the legislative veto issue illustrates, in a striking
way, that his position is far from being the result of detached
adherence to neutral principles.
One of the arguments relied on by Justice White is nothing
more than a conclusory pronouncement. In order to counter
the suggestion that the legislative veto is an unconstitutional
usurpation of executive and judicial functions, Justice White
asserts that neither branch is ever called upon to perform any
function with respect to a case in which a veto is exercised, because the veto itself precludes both branches from ever acquir-

ing any statutory authorization to act in such a case. 143 In
Chadha, because of the veto, there simply was no statutory
hardship provision for the Executive to administer or the judiciary to use as a basis for review-at least no provision that
could apply to Mr. Chadha. This argument, however, merely
assumes the constitutionality of the legislative veto rather than
establishing it. If the veto is not constitutional it cannot limit
the scope of executive or judicial power. This argument by Jus143.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2809-10 (White, J., dissenting).
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tice White thus fails completely. 144
Justice White also proceeds to undermine his own position
by suggesting that a legislative veto exercised to nullify
prosecutorial discretion would constitute an unconstitutional
usurpation of executive power, though the veto in Chadha did
not.145 If, as Justice White suggests, the legislative veto in
Chadha limits the scope of permissible executive action under
the statute containing the veto provision, it serves precisely the
same function where prosecutorial discretion is involved.
Prosecutorial discretion is not the power to ignore a statute.
Rather, it is the executive power to resolve matters in a manner
not foreclosed by the legislature under the terms of the statute.
If the statute forecloses a particular exercise of discretion, however, either by its terms or, under Justice White's view, through
exercise of a legislative veto, that particular exercise of discretion is not open to the Executive because the statute does not
authorize it. To the extent that this can be characterized as interference with inherent executive power, it is difficult to see
why that interference is any different from the interference
with executive power that occurred in Chadha itself. In fact,
the Attorney General's decision not to deport Mr. Chadha even
though he was deportable under the statute' is, in substance,
identical to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion-the very
discretion that Justice White suggests cannot be undermined
by a legislative veto. If interference with the Executive is impermissible in either case, it should be impermissible in both.
In response to the majority's argument that the legislative
veto is unconstitutional because it permits the government to
act without the concurrence of the three constituencies specified in the article I legislative process,147 Justice White argues
that the three constituencies have, in fact, agreed to the result
produced by a legislative veto. He does this by viewing the
subject executive action-the Attorney General's suspension of
Mr. Chadha's deportation-as an executive proposal for legislation that becomes effective only if both houses of Congress
agree, as indicated by their failure to veto it. Accordingly, in
144. Justice White's argument in this regard would have had more appeal if
he had persuasively argued in favor of some version of the contingency theory
discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99. There are, however, problems with this theory. See infra text accompanying notes 165-66 and
s-upra text accomapnying notes 139-42.
145. See 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting).
146. See supra note 5.
147. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-84.
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Justice White's view, the legal status quo-Chadha's deportability-is changed only with the concurrence of each of
the three pertinent constituencies, thereby satisfying the objective of the article I procedures required by the majority.1 4 8
Justice White's theory forces him to view Mr. Chadha's deportability as the legal status quo. If the Attorney General's
suspension of deportation proceedings were deemed the legal
status quo, the legislative veto would permit it to be changed
by one House of Congress, thereby defeating the three-constituency concurrence that Justice White is trying to establish.
There are substantial reasons for rejecting Justice White's position and viewing the suspension of deportability as the status
quo. First, the suspension was the last act to occur before a
legislative veto is exercised. Second, if the veto were not exercised, the suspension of deportability would be the act that had
legal effect. Third, a duly enacted statute gives the suspension
this effect, thus establishing the legal status quo. Moreover, the
only argument that Justice White offers in favor of his contrary
view assumes that the status quo is set by the statute containing the veto provision. He argues that the exercise of a legislative veto does not change the status quo precisely because it is
authorized by the underlying statute.14 9 Once again, however,
Justice White has improperly assumed the validity of the legislative veto as one of the steps in his argument to establish its
validity. If the veto is invalid, the legal status quo is necessarily the state of affairs created by the statute without its veto
provision.150
Further evidence of the unacceptability of Justice White's
"proposal for legislation" argument is provided by the anomalous result that would flow from its acceptance. As Justice
White himself seems to appreciate, under his analysis the oneHouse veto would be constitutional, but the two-House veto
would be unconstitutional.151 Since under a two-House veto
scheme, one House alone could make the Attorney General's
148. Id. at 2806-08 (White, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 2807.
150. This is true at least where the offending legislative veto provision is
found to be severable from the remaining provisions of the statute as it was in
Chadha. See id. at 2774-76.
A more complicated view of the status quo is that Chadha possesses a contingent right to remain in the United States subject to divestiture through the
exercise of a legislative veto. For a discussion of the problems with this view,
see infra text accompanying notes 165-66, and supra text accompanying notes

139-42.
151.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (White, J., dissenting).
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proposal to suspend deportation legally effective by simply failing to veto the proposal, the three-constituency concurrence
that Justice White is trying to establish would be defeated. Although Justice White at times appears to indicate that he could
live with this result, 5 2 it is truly counter-intuitive. If the constitutional objection to the legislative veto is that it shortcuts the
legislative process,' 53 one might well wonder why a veto requiring the concurrence of two Houses of Congress should be more
offensive than a veto requiring the concurrence of only one. In
fact, Justice White's argument in this regard seems to be quite
disingenuous. While asserting a position that would invalidate
the two-House veto in one part of his opinion, 5 4 Justice White
suggests in another part of the same opinion that the twoHouse veto should be viewed as constitutional because the
Framers contemplated it.55 Moreover, Justice White appears
to have forgotten his "proposal for legislation" argument in
United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 5 6 where
he dissented from the majority's invalidation of a two-House
legislative veto,157 even though such a veto would have to be
viewed as unconstitutional under the theory that he asserted in
Chadha a few days earlier.
In response to the majority's contention that a legislative
veto is an inchoate "law" that must be "enacted" in accordance
with the prescribed article I procedures,' 5 8 Justice White argues that a legislative veto is a mere negation of an executive
act and not a legislative act that must comply with article .L159
As noted above, the majority is unable to establish satisfactorily that a legislative veto is a "law,"160 but Justice White is no
more successful in establishing that it is not. In fact, very little
of Justice White's opinion addresses this matter, and the portion of the opinion that does is self-defeating.
Justice White concedes that the Framers intended to prevent the article I procedures from being circumvented through
nomenclature; an act having legislative effect should not escape
article I procedures simply by being termed something other
152. See id. at 2808.
153. This is the objection that the majority found to be controlling. See id.
at 2786-88.
154. See id. at 2808.
155. See id. at 2800-01 n.18.
156. 103.S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
157. Id. at 3557-58.
158. See 103 S. Ct. at 2784-88.
159. Id. at 2799-801 (White, J., dissenting).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 79-97.
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than legislation.161 Curiously, however, rather than then discussing the definition of a legislative act, Justice White proceeds to discuss the necessary and proper clause.162 Because
the necessary and proper clause does nothing to sharpen the
meaning of the term "legislative act," Justice White's reference
to that provision appears to be a total nonsequitur. That provision would only be even arguably relevant if Justice White intended to suggest that legislative vetoes are constitutional
despite their noncompliance with article I simply because Congress has deemed them to be necessary and proper. If that is
what Justice White intended, it is unacceptable for two reasons. First, it gives Congress limitless power. If Congress
could ignore article I whenever it was expedient to do so, it
could also ignore the due process or equal protection clause, or
any other provision of the Constitution, whenever expediency
so dictated.163 Second, the language of the necessary and
proper clause is directly at odds with such an expansive construction. The clause does not authorize Congress to do anything that it deems necessary and proper, but only to make
"laws" that are necessary and proper. 6 4 Because, by Justice
White's own admission, "laws" can be made only in accordance
with the article I procedures,1 65 it is difficult to see how the necessary and proper clause could possibly authorize the exercise
of a legislative veto. Moreover, by failing to offer any serious
explanation of why a legislative veto should not be viewed as a
"law," Justice White never establishes that his dissenting opinion is entitled to any more respect than the majority opinion.
Although Justice White failed to establish that a legislative
veto is not a "law," one might nevertheless be inclined to adopt
his position if some other argument were available to demonstrate that a veto is not a "law." The discussion of the majority
opinion above suggested that, rather than itself constituting a
law, a legislative veto could be viewed as a contingency whose
nonoccurrence triggers the operation of a law.166 There is nothing particularly wrong with this formulation, but there is noth161. 103 S. Ct. at 2799-800 (White, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2801-02.

163. One could argue that there is a distinction between structural arguments to protect individual liberties and direct arguments to protect individual
liberties, and that rejection of the former does not necessitate rejection of the
latter.
164. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408,
433 (9th Cir. 1980), afd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
165. 103 S. Ct. at 2799-800 (White, J., dissenting).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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ing particularly right with it either. Intuitively, the formulation
seems suspect because the contingency on which the effectiveness of the law depends is under the control of Congress,
which also enacted the law. This dilution in separation of powers protections poses the bill of attainder problems discussed
in connection with Justice Powell's opinion.167 In order to determine whether those problems are sufficiently serious to defeat the acceptability of the contingency formulation, however,
one would first have to make fundamental decisions about the
meaning of our separation of powers principles, as the discussion of Justice Powell's opinion illustrates. Though none of the
doctrines discussed in any of the opinions makes those decisions for us, Justice White's opinion is particularly unhelpful in
this regard.
The majority opinion notwithstanding, categorization of the
legislative veto as a "law" is not necessarily fatal to the constitutionality of the veto. The one powerful argument made by
Justice White in favor of the veto's constitutionality, stripped to
its essentials, is that, if administrative agencies can make law
through rulemaking, a House of Congress should also be able
to make law through the exercise of a legislative veto.168 Once
again, Justice White makes a curious concession when he suggests that, although one- and two-House vetoes can survive
constitutional scrutiny under this theory, committee vetoes
might not be able to do So. 1 6 9 The analogy to administrative
lawmaking should govern committee lawmaking to the same
extent that it governs lawmaking by one House of Congress.
Despite this anomaly, however, Justice White's argument has
some appeal. Administrative agency rulemaking does not comply with the procedures prescribed by article I, yet it has effects that are every bit as real as the effects of legislation. In
fact, because of the volume and pervasiveness of agency regulations, the effects of agency rulemaking may be more significant than the effects of legislation. Congress must comply with
article I procedures but agencies need not because, doctrinally,
agencies do not make law. The nondelegation doctrine, by requiring Congress to prescribe legislative standards confining
executive discretion, ensures that agencies administer rather
than make law.' 7 0 On the other hand, because a House of Congress is not part of the executive branch of government, the
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra text accompanying notes 130-42.
See 103 S. Ct. at 2801-04 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2798 n.15.
See supra note 83.
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only branch constitutionally empowered to administer laws, it
cannot administer a law.171 Although the nondelegation doctrine is largely a legal fiction, 7 2 it is a fiction that serves a purpose, and Justice White's argument ultimately fails to be
persuasive because it never explains why that purpose need
not continue to be served.
As a technical matter, the nondelegation doctrine permits
agency rulemaking that does not comply with article I proce73
dures to occur only when guided by legislative standards.1
Although the standards contained in much modern legislation
are so broad that they do virtually nothing to constrain executive discretion, 7 4 they do have important symbolic value that
distinguishes legislative vetoes from agency rulemaking. The
distinction relates to judicial review. Under a legislative veto
scheme, the power to make law is delegated to a House of Congress with no limitation whatsoever; a House of Congress has
the power to exercise a veto for any reason, or no reason at all,
without ever explaining its actions. The Chadha case itself illustrates this fact quite clearly. 75 Even though administrative
agencies operate under statutory standards that are very
broad, 76 the mere existence of a standard, despite its breadth,
reflects our preference for judicial review of agency actions. In
fact, the courts have developed elaborate mechanisms for giving enough meaning to otherwise vacuous. statutory standards
to permit a degree of judicial review sufficient to ensure that
agency rulemaking does not fall below some minimal level of
acceptability.177 Moreover, such judicial review, which applies
171. U.S. CONST., art. I1, § 1. This argument was relied on more heavily by
the court of appeals when it invalidated the legislative veto in Chadha. See 634
F.2d at 431-33.
172. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See supra note 5.
176. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
177. When asked to engage in judicial review of agency actions taken under
broad statutory delegations, courts are often at a loss for ways in which to exercise their reviewing function without merely substituting their discretion for
that of the agency. The reason that judicial review is so difficult is that the governing statute is too general to guide either the agency or the reviewing court
in ascertaining the intent of Congress. Indeed, broad statutory delegations may
well signify that Congress never formulated any specific intent but, rather,
merely gave the problems to the agency to resolve. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. A central concern of most administrative law courses relates
to how courts should deal with the problem of reviewing agency action taken
under broad statutory delegations. One common judicial response to this problem has been to demand that the agency produce an administrative record suf-
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to agency rulemaking as well as to agency adjudication,178 is
valuable not only because it protects the due process rights of
individuals subject to agency adjudications-the issue with
which Justice Powell was concerned' 7 9-but also because judicial oversight presumably improves the quality of agency
rulemaking, where individual rights are not of immediate concern. Accordingly, the difference between agency rulemaking
and lawmaking by a House of Congress under a legislative veto
scheme is that a legislative veto presents no opportunity for judicial review. To be sure, the absence of review is not caused
by the absence of any standard governing the exercise of a legislative veto. Rather, the absence of a standard reflects our understanding that courts do not directly review legislative
actions, which are primarily controlled through the political accountability of the legislature.180 What is important, however,
is that judicial review is unavailable, regardless of the reason
why.
If we were to adopt Justice White's suggestion and either
abandon the nondelegation fiction or extend it far enough to
encompass the legislative veto, we would be reducing the role
of the judiciary in the governmental process to a degree that
has not resulted simply from our creation of the administrative
state. Whether or not one believes this to be desirable, it does
reveal the flaw in Justice White's reasoning. The constitutionality of lawmaking through a legislative veto device does not
follow ineluctably from the constitutionality of rulemaking by
administrative agencies. In suggesting that it does, Justice
White demonstrates little sensitivity to the role that we typically assign to the judiciary in the governmental process.181 If
ficient to convince the court that the agency has adequately considered all the
relevant factors before choosing a course of action. This has been referred to
as "hard look" review because the reviewing court theoretically ensures that
the agency has taken a "hard look" at the regulatory problem. Under this procedure, when the court lacks confidence in the soundness of the agency's decision it tends to remand to the agency for further proceedings. See generally S.
BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 4, at 291-309.
178. "Hard look" review is generally thought to be authorized by a reviewing court's obligation under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure that agency action is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise unlawful-a standard that applies both to agency rulemaking and adjudication. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)
(1982).
179. See 103 S. Ct. at 2789-90, 2792 (Powell, J., concurring).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
181. It is now generally expected that the judiciary will have the final say
about the validity of all significant or controversial administrative agency
actions.
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Justice White wishes to establish that lawmaking by legislative
veto is constitutionally permissible, he must do more than
merely ride the coattails of administrative agencies. He must
explain why reduced levels of judicial review are appropriate.
His opinion is unpersuasive precisely because it does not do
this. Moreover, it is unlikely that any doctrine could ever determine what level of judicial review is appropriate. One's
views on that matter are almost certainly going to be a function
of one's subjective values and policy preferences.
Justice White might have chosen simply to assert that the
veto had to be held constitutional unless it was affirmatively
demonstrated to be unconstitutional. As a practical matter,
that tends to be the way that the burden of proof is allocated in
constitutional cases. 182 As a doctrinal matter, however, a decision in favor of constitutionality based on nothing more than
defects in the challenging arguments is not very satisfying. It
does not establish that the veto is consistent with our doctrinal
principles; it merely generates a result in cases where we do
not know whether it is consistent with those principles or not.
Moreover, to the extent that one might suggest that the burden
of proof rule itself reflects a doctrinal principle, one would have
to explain satisfactorily what that doctrinal principle was. Although some supporting policies could be specified, such as deferring to the will of the majority, as evidenced by the
enactments of its elected representatives, unless there is a
demonstrated reason not to do so, equally persuasive policies
could also be specified to support a contrary allocation of the
burden of proof. For example, one might assert that a government of limited, enumerated powers should not be permitted to
take actions that interfere with individual autonomy unless it is
first able to demonstrate that a contemplated action falls within
the scope of its enumerated powers. Neither principle is manifestly better than the other, and unless a particular allocation
of the burden of proof is convincingly shown to advance one
controlling doctrinal objective, the burden of proof rule is itself
nothing more than a subjective preference.
The very structure of Justice White's opinion, which begins
with an extensive defense of the policies thought to be embodied in the legislative veto,183 as well as the artificiality and in182. The proponent of unconstitutionality, whether a civil plaintiff or a civil
or criminal defendant, generally has the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the challenged action or enactment.
183. See 103 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (White, J., dissenting).
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consistency of many of the arguments made in the opinion,
suggest that Justice White was primarily concerned with policy
and that he was willing to manipulate doctrine in order to make
it coincide with his policy preference. Nothing illustrates this
more clearly than Justice White's suggestion that the Court, despite its constitutional holding, deems legislative vetoes to constitute conclusive statements of legislative intent to preclude
vetoed executive actions.184 Such a view of the veto would, of
course, permit precisely the policy result that, by hypothesis,
was impermissible as a matter of principle. Although Justice
White's transparent doctrinal manipulation makes it difficult to
conceive of legal doctrine as a determinate set of rules that
compel particular results, there would be nothing wrong with
deciding cases in accordance with governing policies if the policies were both acceptable and determinate. As the controversy
surrounding the policy desirability of the legislative veto
reveals,185 however, policy agreement can be difficult to secure,
and even if agreement about policy objectives could be secured, disputes would still arise concerning the best ways to
pursue those policies. As has already been discussed, the
availability or unavailability of the legislative veto may make
little difference with respect to how the government operates.1 86 Moreover, if it does turn out to make a difference, it is
difficult to predict what that difference will be.187 As a result,
legal decisions based on guesses about the extent to which
those decisions will advance a particular policy preference
hardly merit homage as a species of principled decisionmaking.
Even if one seeks to ignore immediate, politically-tainted policies and root legal decisions in fundamental policies that are
generally accepted, the enterprise remains indeterminate. In
fact, it becomes dizzyingly circular.

C. ANALYrICAL SPIN
The object of doctrinal analysis is to arrive at resolutions
that are rooted in principle rather than subjective preference.
For present purposes, a "principle" is a general proposition reflecting an aspirational objective, such as the proposition that
people should drive safely. Principles tend to be pursued
through "rules," which are specific directives and are easier
184. Id. at 2796 n.11.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 49-74.

187. See id.
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than principles to apply, such as the directive that people
should not drive faster than fifty-five miles per hour.188 Principles are useful only to the extent that they are generally
agreed-upon. Rules are useful only to the extent that they can
successfully be shown to follow from some principle. A rule
that is not adequately traceable to an underlying principle is
merely a subjective preference. All that can be offered to justify the existence of such a rule is that someone approves of it
for some arbitrary reason. The principles themselves are actually only subjective preferences, unless one believes in natural
truths. But that observation is relatively unimportant as long
as the principles are commonly-accepted. Legal doctrine is the
collection of principles and rules on which we rely to avoid
making arbitrary legal decisions-decisions based upon nothing more than the subjective preferences of the decisionmakers. As used in the present context, "doctrine" also
includes any nonlegal policies, such as economic or political
science policies, that we might seek to advance through principled legal decisionmaking.
Although the object of doctrinal analysis is to ensure principled rather than subjective decisionmaking, the endeavor is
necessarily futile. If the governing principle is stated in terms
specific enough to compel particular results in particular cases,
it will be too controversial to command general acceptance; the
principle itself will be viewed as nothing more than a subjective preference, or a rule that is not linked to any underlying
policy. If the principle is stated in terms that are general
enough to make it noncontroversial, it will be subject to manipulation permitting it to generate contradictory results, and the
only way to choose between those results will be through recourse to subjective preferences.1 8 9 Because of this dilemma,
principled analysis simply goes around and around and there is
no nonsubjective way out of this analytical spin. Attempted
resolution of the constitutional issues raised by the legislative
veto demonstrates this.
Principled analysis of the legislative veto starts with specification of the governing principle. The opinions in Chadha and
in other cases that discuss the constitutionality of the legislative veto treat separation of powers as the governing princi188. Various commentators have used the terms "principle" and "rule" in
various ways. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 2, at 593 n.26, 601.
189. See J. ELY, supra note 92, at 64-65 (quoting R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND

PoLmcs 241 (1975)).
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ple.190 The legislative veto is unconstitutional if it violates the

principle of separation of powers and valid if it does not. Selection of separation of powers as the governing principle is in no
sense inherent or unexceptionable. The legislative veto also
could be viewed, for example, as implicating federalism concerns. The awkward and inefficient legislative procedures prescribed by the Framers have the practical effect of imposing a
constraint on the scope of activities in which the federal government can engage. At any given level of legislative effort,
Congress could enact more statutes using efficient procedures
than it could using inefficient procedures. If the Framers chose
to impose this constraint in order to prevent federal regulation
from interfering with state sovereignty to an unwarranted degree, the legislative veto may well undermine the principle of
federalism. By serving as a device that encourages Congress to
make broad delegations to administrative agencies, thereby
permitting agencies to engage in regulatory activities traditionally reserved to the states,191 the legislative veto could be seen
to upset the balance of federalism. If the veto is as important
to the survival of broad agency delegations as many proponents
say that it isj,192 there will be fewer broad delegations without
the veto and, consequently, less agency interference with state
regulation. Accordingly, the veto may be unconstitutional on
federalism grounds if the increase in federal regulation that it
permits crosses over the line between permissible and impermissible federal interference with state sovereignty. Of course,
it could also be argued that the legislative veto enhances federalism concerns by giving the Senate, which represents state interests, more power to overrule executive actions intruding on
state prerogatives than the Senate would have in the absence
of a legislative veto.193 The point is that separation of powers
does not constitute the only possible starting place for principled analysis of the legislative veto. In fact, selection of the
governing principle is likely to be nothing more than an exer190. See cases cited supra note 14.
191. The tenth amendment truism is sometimes thought to symbolize the
proposition that the federal government cannot properly interfere in matters
that are traditionally subject to state control. See L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 225,
301.
192. See 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note 12.
193. A one-House veto gives the states, acting through the Senate, total
power to preclude executive actions thought to frustrate state interests. Al-

though a two-House veto does not give the Senate total power to preclude such
executive actions, it does facilitate preclusion by eliminating the need for the
two-thirds majority votes in each House that would be required to override a

presidential veto.
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cise in the very subjectivity from which the principle is
designed to protect us. Nevertheless, if the principle could be
shown to produce one result, that result would be acceptable at
least to those who concurred in the selection of the governing
principle. However, no such showing can be made.
Even assuming that separation of powers principles govern
the constitutionality of the legislative veto, one cannot determine how those principles apply without going around an endless circle. Whether separation of powers principles are
described as preventing one branch from acting without the
concurrence of another, or preventing one branch from usurping power belonging to another, or preventing one branch from
ignoring procedures prescribed to govern its activities, the gist
of separation of powers is that the government as a whole
should not take an action without the consent of the governed.
The concurrence of specified constituencies, obtained by surviving an ordeal of checks and balances, is relevant only because it ensures the reliability of that consent. If the judiciary
approves an action taken by an executive agency in order to
further a policy adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives and signed into law by the President, all in accordance with the way in which the Framers believed that the will
of the people could be accurately ascertained, that action is
said to have the consent of the governed. The problem is that
the governed consent to a lot of things that are mutually
exclusive.
The legislative veto is criticized for what amounts to
shortcutting the process by which consent is to be obtained,194
and thereby undermining the genuineness of that consent.
When the House of Representatives vetoed the suspension of
Mr. Chadha's deportation' 9 5 it did so even though the Senate,
the President, and the judiciary might all have disapproved.
Accordingly, the veto exercised in Chadha is plainly unconstitutional because it can hardly be said to represent the will of
the people-except, of course, for the fact that it does. All legislative vetoes are authorized by duly enacted statutes, approved
by all pertinent constituencies after exposure to all checks and
balances. Accordingly, the veto exercised in Chadha is plainly
constitutional because it represents the will of the people as
measured by our most reliable indicator, the governmental process itself. Now watch the analytical spin begin.
194. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
195. See supra note 5.
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It might be argued that this analysis is flawed precisely because the legislative veto was not approved by all pertinent
constituencies. The judiciary, which represents the constituency favoring protection of individuals like Mr. Chadha from
unauthorized governmental actions, did not consent to the statute authorizing the legislative veto. It found the statute to be
unconstitutional, and thereby vindicated the integrity of the
system. The flaw, however, is only apparent. The judiciary did
not invalidate the legislative veto because it interfered with
Chadha's individual rights. In fact, it studiously avoided doing
so. 1 9 6 Rather, the Supreme Court held the legislative veto to be
unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with separation of
powers principles. 197 Why was the legislative veto inconsistent
with separation of powers principles? Because it was not approved by the judiciary, whose approval is necessary for a reliable indication of consent. Why was it not approved by the
Judiciary? Because it was inconsistent with separation of powers principles. And around and around.
Analytical spin is the doctrinal paralysis that results when
a principle acquires meaning only by feeding on itself.19 8 Such
circular reasoning makes the principle indeterminate. When
one of the terms in a formula for applying a principle is the
very principle being applied, the formula prescribes no result
and the principle does not control the outcome. The only way
to break out of analytical spin is to assign the principle some
meaning, which ultimately can be derived only from a subjective preference. The way to break out of the separation of powers spin is to decide that popular consent to the underlying
legislative veto scheme either is or is not a more reliable indicator.of the will of the people than the lack of popular consent
196. Although Justice Powell wished to invalidate the legislative veto for interfering with Mr. Chadha's individual rights, see 103 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Powell,
J., concurring), the majority rejected this theory, see id. at 2787 n.21.
197. Id. at 2787-88.
198. The present conception of analytical spin was inspired by Duncan Kennedy's theory of "loopification." See Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354-57 (1982). Other commentators have demonstrated the presence of similar circular reasoning in doctrinal analysis. See, e.g., Leff, Law and, 87 YALE UJ. 989, 1006-08 (1978)
(demonstrating circularity in particular economic analysis of commodity consumption); Tushnet, Book Review, Marxism As Metaphor, 68 CORNELL L REV.
281, 287-90 (1983) (reviewing H. COLLINs, AW
sm AND LAw (1982)) (demonstrating circularity in particular Marxist analysis of reification). One of the difficulties in analyzing things is that the analysis is, in part at least, a function of
the way that we look at things. In fact, the very act of looking at things may
change them. Cf. H. PAGELS, THE COSIC CODE 87-91 (1982) (discussing
Heisenberg's "Uncertainty Principle").
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that accompanies particular exercises of the veto. There is,
however, no way to make this relative reliability determination
except by recourse to subjective preferences. The principle
necessarily fails to make the determination, and the object of
the principled decisionnaking has therefore been frustrated.
This analytical spin is inherent in any formulation of separation of powers principles that can be applied to the legislative
veto. The majority in Chadha invalidated the veto because it
constituted a "law" that has not been enacted in accordance
with the constitutionally prescribed procedures. 199 The reason
that a particular veto is itself a "law," rather than merely part
of the duly enacted underlying law authorizing the veto, is that
the veto itself alters Chadha's legal right to remain in the country, which was granted by the underlying statute.200 How do
we know that the underlying statute did not merely grant
Chadha a right subject to divestiture by a legislative veto? Because a legislative veto cannot divest someone of legal rights
since it is not "enacted" in accordance with the constitutionally
prescribed procedures. One can break out of this spin only by
subjectively adopting a position about the desirability of the
legislative veto device and defining "law" in a way that advances that position.
The spin generated by Justice Powell's separation of powers formulation relates to judicial review. Simply put, Justice
Powell's objection to the legislative veto is that it interferes
with the ability of the judiciary to protect individual rights from
arbitrary governmental abrogation. 2 01 In the Chadha case, the
veto prevented the judiciary from protecting Chadha's statutory right to remain in the country. Why was Chadha not
divested of that right when the veto was exercised, thereby defeating the existence of any right for the judiciary to protect?
Because the veto was unconstitutional, thereby rendering it ineffective to defeat the existence of a legal right. Why was the
veto unconstitutional? Because it interfered with the ability of
the judiciary to protect individual rights. The only way out of
this spin is to arrive at a subjective conclusion about the constitutionality of the veto and to define the legal "right"
accordingly.
Justice White's position also spins. Cleared of its doctrinal
camouflage, that position appears to be that our organic Consti199.
200.
201.

See 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
See id. at 2784-85.
See id. at 2791-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tution should be flexible enough to tolerate political innovations that arise to meet practical necessities. Because the
legislative veto constitutes an innovation that is essential to
proper maintenance of the administrative state, something that
was not contemplated by the Framers, the separation of powers
principle must be construed to permit the legislative veto.202 In
order to make that position work, Justice White must explain
why the enhanced agency accountability offered by the legislative veto is preferable to the executive discretion that would
prevail in the absence of a legislative veto. Presumably, this
enhanced accountability is preferable because it places final
control over governmental policymaking back in the hands of
Congress where it belongs. But this cannot be established
without succumbing to analytical spin. Under our constitutional scheme, Congress is supposed to make policy decisions.
However, the legislative veto exercised in Chadha permitted
one House, rather than Congress, to make policy. As a separation of powers matter, why does not that undermine the constitutional requirement that policy be made by Congress?
Because the full Congress, acting in accordance with the prescribed procedures, made a policy decision to permit one
House to formulate congressional policy.
Although not expressly made in any of the Chadha opinions, one of the most common arguments offered to invalidate
the legislative veto is that it vests executive power in Congress.
This is argued to be unconstitutional because Congress is not
part of the executive branch of government, which is the only
branch authorized to exercise executive power.203 This argument spins in three different directions at once. The spin begins by asking why executive power can only be exercised by
the executive branch. First, if the answer is that this is necessary to ensure the availability of judicial review, because congressional administration of the statute would be immunized
from judicial review, 204 the argument spins. Congressional action that would be immune from judicial review would be legislative rather than executive in nature, and because it was
legislative in nature, would preclude the existence of any congressionally-created right to serve as the basis for judicial
review. 20 5
202.
203.
204.
205.

See
See
See
See

id. at 2793-96 (White, J., dissenting).
supra note 171.
supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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Second, if the reason that executive power can only be exercised by the executive branch is that congressional exercise
of executive power would interfere with some inherent discretion possessed by the Executive, the argument spins again.
Congress can certainly enact legislation so narrow that it
20 6
leaves virtually no discretion for the Executive to exercise.
This is true at least up to whatever limitation the bill of attainder clause imposes, ascertainment of which would have a spin
of its own. 207 If Congress can make such narrow delegations, it
is difficult to see how the Executive can possess some inherent
discretion that Congress chose not to delegate when it reserved
the right to exercise a legislative veto. If the Executive does
possess such discretion, it must be because the mechanism
used by Congress to preclude the Executive from possessing
that discretion is invalid. Accordingly, the question of whether
the legislative veto unconstitutionally usurps executive power
turns on something no less monumental than whether the legislative veto is unconstitutional.
Third, if executive power can be exercised only by the Executive because article H of the Constitution provides that it is
the President who "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," 208 the argument still spins. The law that the President is required to faithfully execute provides for a legislative
veto. If that law is invalid, there is no law for the President to
execute and, therefore, no executive function for Congress to
usurp.

209

Circularity is one thing; but what makes the separation of
powers spin so analytically paralyzing is its inherent self-contradiction. The various doctrinal formulations offered to govern
constitutional analysis of the legislative veto all assume that
the action of a portion of Congress in exercising a veto somehow equals an action of the entire Congress. For Justice White,
this equivalence is what gives the veto its efficiency and policy
206. See, e.g., statutes listed in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 250-74
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
207. In order to ascertain whether the bill of attainder prohibition applies
under customary jurisprudence one would have to grapple with the
right/benefit distinction, see 103 S. Ct. at 2792 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring), which
involves the circularity inherent in determining whether conferral of a benefit
on one individual abrogates the rights of other individuals on whom the benefit
was not conferred. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
208. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. See supra text accompanying note 203.
209. This is true at least where the offending legislative veto provision is not
severable from the remaining provisions of the statute. If the veto provision is
severable, the President will be able to administer the remaining statutory provisions without any congressional usurpation of Executive power.
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desirability. For Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, the
equivalence is what makes the veto unconstitutional. A legislative veto, however, is not the equivalent of an act of Congress.
Rather, as noted above, a legislative veto is the opposite of an
act of Congress. 210 By definition, a legislative veto is only exercised when the full Congress is unable or unwilling to take the
action that the veto is intended to effect. It is at least curious,
therefore, that constitutional analysis of the legislative veto has
tended to equate the two.
Indeed, if a legislative veto really were the equivalent of an
act of Congress, the Chadha decision would have no effect
whatsoever. Chadha holds that Congress cannot constitutionally pass a statute permitting a part of Congress to speak for
the entire Congress. If; however, Congress genuinely desired
the efficiency of the legislative veto enough to outweigh the loss
in representativeness that results when a veto is exercised
without the concurrence of all pertinent constituencies, it could
easily circumvent the Chadha decision. The full Congress
would simply have to agree to ratify by two-thirds vote any
veto decision made by a specified House or committee of Congress. That ratification would then transform the legislative
veto into duly enacted legislation. It would have enough support to withstand a presidential veto and would satisfy all of
the requirements specified in Chadha.211 Because the full Congress will have agreed to such ratification beforehand, the
whole process could occur with virtually the same efficiency as
a direct legislative veto. Members of Congress could agree informally to such a procedure, or they could all sign a contract,
or they could even promulgate the procedure into the rules of
each House.
One might argue that such an agreement would be unconstitutional precisely because it undermined the holding in
Chadha. That argument, however, has very questionable
merit. Such an agreement looks much like the everyday logrolling and other forms of political compromise that we tend to
accept as the backbone of the political process. Moreover, the
Constitution certainly does not require each legislator, without
being influenced by political considerations, to formulate an independent position on each legislative issue that comes to the
210. See supra text following note 78.
211. The ratification would satisfy the bicameralism and presentment requirements. See 103 S. Ct. at 2780-84.
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floor of Congress. 212 Regardless of the constitutional validity of
such an agreement, however, Congress is unlikely to adopt
such a scheme. The danger that individual members would
breach the agreement with respect to particular vetoes would
be too high. Moreover, Chadha does seem to hold that such an
agreement cannot be made legally enforceable. 2 13 The reason
that an individual member would breach the agreement is that
the action of the House or committee delegated veto authority
would not represent that member's position. The breaching
member would not only disapprove of the proposed veto, but
would disapprove strongly enough to ignore the need for legislative efficiency that had led to development of the veto
scheme. Whenever this were true with respect to more than
one-third of the members of either House, the veto could not
automatically be ratified. 214 That Congress is unlikely to implement such a scheme reveals that Congress believes that
breaches by more than one-third of the members will be common-something that intuitively seems correct. If fatal
breaches will in fact be common, the legislative veto, which
could not always secure ratification by Congress, is not the
equivalent of an act of Congress.
Although an appreciation of the divergence between legislative vetoes and acts of Congress affects the constitutional
analysis of the veto, its effect is, of course, indeterminate. If a
veto is not the equivalent of an act of Congress, then it need
not comply with article I procedures as the majority insists that
it must. 215 Moreover, such a veto does not interfere with the

ability of the judiciary to review its exercise for arbitrariness
on due process grounds because it is not a congressional action
that is immune from meaningful judicial review. 216 If a legislative veto is not an act of Congress, however, it must be the exercise of some delegated authority. And this delegation is
completely standardless, in seeming violation of the nondelegation doctrine. 2 17 In addition, it is difficult to see why one would
212. Even if such an argument had merit, it is likely that the courts would
decline to entertain a lawsuit raising the argument, dismissing the suit on political question or other justiciability grounds.
213. Presumably, even if the suggested agreement were made part of the
rules of each House, it would not be judicially enforceable. See 103 S. Ct. at
2786 n.20.
214. Without the assurance of the votes of two-thirds of the members of
each House, a presidential veto could not automatically be overridden.
215. See supra text accompanying note 79.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
217. See supra note 85.
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want to expand our organic Constitution218 in order to facilitate
agency accountability to some entity that is not Congress and
necessarily acts in a way that Congress would not act. The legislative veto is not truly a legislative veto, but that perception
does nothing to improve the quality of constitutional analysis.
It merely reverses the direction of the analytical spin. The only
way to ascertain the effect that such a perception should have
on constitutional analysis is to make a subjective determination of whether the legislative veto represents the will of
Congress.
There is a striking irony in all of this. The legislative veto
has gained popularity because it provides a possible means for
correcting alleged agency abuses.219 The cause of those abuses
is the near-total breakdown in separation of powers protections
that results from broad congressional delegations of authority
to administrative agencies. Those broad statutory delegations
grant agencies vast discretion to make rules, apply those rules,
and adjudicate the validity of particular applications of the
rules. The same agency is permitted to exercise all three governmental functions. Moreover, the breadth of the statutory
standards governing agency actions limits the scope of judicial
review by providing statutory authorization for almost anything
that an agency wishes to do.220
The very reason administrative agencies have become the
core of our governmental structure is that their freedom from
separation of powers constraints permits them to operate with
a degree of efficiency that is indispensable to modern governmental activities. Many people believe that the federal government has become so big and undertaken so many regulatory
responsibilities that it can no longer operate in accordance with
the separation of powers inefficiencies contemplated by the
Framers. 221 Whether this renders the administrative agencies
themselves unconstitutional depends upon one's subjective
views of the nature and function of the Constitution.2 22 None218.
219.

See supra text accompanying note 202.
See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2793-95 (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note

12.
220. Cf. supra notes 177-78 (discussion of "Hard look" review).
221. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 2793-95 (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note
12.
222. If one believes that the three-branch structure of government designed
by the Framers should be retained in a meaningful sense, one would probably
conclude that the existence and power of administrative agencies are sufficiently inconsistent with a three-branch form of government that the agencies
themselves are unconstitutional. If one believes that the Constitution should
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theless, reliance on the legislative veto to cure perceived
agency abuses is quite ironic.
The reason that the legislative veto works is that it too constitutes a breakdown in separation of powers safeguards. Congress, acting through the full legislative process, cannot control
agency activities as effectively as it can using the legislative
veto, because the legislative veto process is more efficient than
the full legislative process. It is more efficient because it dispenses with the need for the concurrence, in particular veto decisions, of each of the constitutionally specified constituencies.
The irony is that in order to correct abuses produced by the
breakdown of separation of powers in administrative agencies,
Congress has further broken down separation of powers by authorizing the legislative veto. It is difficult to know whether
this is proper because one must "fight fire with fire," or improper because "two wrongs don't make a right." What is clear,
however, is that the nature of government has changed since
the Framers devised their scheme. Whether the change is
viewed as good or bad turns on a complex set of factors that ultimately turns on one's subjective preferences. It certainly
does not turn on something as indeterminate as doctrine.
II.

IMPLICATIONS

The indeterminacy that frustrates doctrinal analysis of the
legislative veto can be extrapolated to all doctrinal analysis.
This is true both as a theoretical matter and as a practical matter. Moreover, it is true with respect to strict legal doctrine and
with respect to the underlying policies that doctrine is intended
to advance. The model of the legal system that emerges from
these perceptions is fraught with contradictions and dominated
by uncertainty. To the extent that the legal system remains viable, it is only because we choose not to dwell on the inconsistencies that lurk beneath the surface of our doctrinal
formulations. However, the perceptions of indeterminacy that
are becoming increasingly common among legal analysts
threaten to undermine the continued viability of our efforts at
principled decisionmaking, at least as presently conceived. But
waxing perceptions of indeterminacy may also signal the start
of a paradigm shift in legal analysis that can move us to new
levels of understanding.
be able to expand to meet contemporary exigencies, and that a large, bureaucratic federal government is a contemporary exigency, one would probably conclude that the administrative branch of government is perfectly constitutional.
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A. Exr APOLAnON
Constitutional analysis of the legislative veto is a useful vehicle for demonstrating the weaknesses in principled analysis
because, in the legislative veto context, the weaknesses are so
salient. Although people who think about such things may
have a position on the constitutionality of the veto, most also
have a sincere appreciation for the strengths of opposing arguments, as well as for the soft spots in their own analyses.
Moreover, because one's position on the constitutionality of the
veto tends to correlate with one's position on its policy desirability, only the most stubborn formalists will refuse to entertain
seriously the suggestion that resolution of the constitutional issues is ultimately based on subjective preferences about the
proper structure and operation of government. Most would
agree that the Chadha case could have been decided either
way and that an adequate judicial opinion could have been
written to accompany either result. Although each of the
Chadha opinions was less than completely persuasive, all were
well within the range of customary Supreme Court persuasiveness. For those willing to accept the view that doctrinal analysis of the legislative veto is indeterminate-that there is no
nonsubjective way of resolving the constitutionality of the
veto-the challenge is to ascertain the scope of doctrinal indeterminacy in general. There are reasons to believe that such
indeterminacy is all-encompassing.
Assuming that Chadha is a case in which subjective factors
rather than principle governed the outcome, why should one infer that all or even most cases are similar to Chadha in this respect? Because the characteristics of doctrine that made it
indeterminate in Chadha will make it indeterminate in all
other cases as well. Separation of powers doctrine was unable
to produce only one result in Chadha because doctrinal principles are not engineered for literal application. One does not
simply honor the bare command to observe separation of powers. Rather, separation of powers is an imprecise, aspirational
concept that must be reduced to an operational level in particular context.= It is this process of moving from the abstract to
the specific that breeds uncertainty. Reasonable people can
differ on what advances separation of powers in the same way
that they can differ on what advances justice, and the language
used to formulate a doctrinal principle cannot alone be relied
223. See Spann, supra note 2, at 632-47.
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upon to prevent those differences from being resolved on the
basis of mere subjective preference. Accordingly, if doctrine is
nevertheless to be viewed as determinate, the body of precedent and subsidiary rules that builds around the doctrinal principle must be shown to constrain judicial discretion and
immunize decisions from subjective preferences. However,
that is a showing that cannot be made.
Precedent does nothing to help resolve a case of first impression. The first case must be resolved on the basis of the
doctrinal language formulation alone, where subjective preferences will necessarily infect the decision. And, in a very meaningful sense, every case is a case of first impression, thereby
making the concept of precedent itself largely illusory. If the
second case does not differ from the first in any material way, it
makes little sense to view the two as separate cases. Resolution of the second case calls for no independent legal analysis
because the case of first impression controls completely. As a
result, resolution of the second case is determined by precisely
the same subjective preferences that governed resolution of the
first.
If the second case does differ from the first, the court must
determine whether that difference is material. The only way to
make this determination is through recourse to the doctrinal
principle. But there is no precedent to assist the court in applying the principle; by definition the only precedent that exists
is distinguishable. Accordingly, the court must apply the principle directly to the second case, making it too a case of first
impression that is captive to the subjective preferences that
necessarily govern all cases of first impression. All subsequent
cases are subject to characterization as cases of first impression in the very same manner.
Another way of stating this is that, in order to determine
whether a precedent is controlling or distinguishable, a court
must apply the governing principle to the factual differences in
order to learn whether those differences are material. The only
way to ascertain the meaning of the governing principle, however, is through recourse to the principle itself. This is precisely the analytical spin that plagued the analyses of the
legislative veto in Chadha, and it is equally destructive of doctrinal determinacy in all other cases.
One might be tempted to argue that recourse to legislative
history, or one of its functional equivalents, 224 can permit prin224.

One example of a functional equivalent would be the judicial opinion
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cipled resolution of a case of first impression. That argument
also fails, however. In the strongest case, the legislative history
will have spoken directly to the facts of the case at issue, prescribing the result in the clearest possible terms. That does
not, however, make the initial case the product of principled judicial resolution. On the contrary, the case will not have been
resolved by a court at all. Rather, it will have been decided directly by the legislature on the basis of the legislature's subjective preferences. Moreover, to suggest that the legislature itself
may have been acting on the basis of principle rather than subjective preference simply begins an infinite regression reminiscent of analytical spin.
In cases where the legislative history does not speak directly to the case at issue, but rather purports to elaborate
upon some general principle that should govern the case, doctrinal determinacy fares no better. If the legislative history
does not directly dispose of the case at issue, the court will
have to determine whether particular examples or statements
of purpose contained in the legislative history do or do not
compel a particular result. Once again, the only way to make
that determination is through reliance on the very principle being elaborated, thereby presenting the same difficulties that
arise when a court tries to follow precedent. Because of all
this, the doctrinal indeterminacy evident in Chadha can be extrapolated to every case.
If the theoretical extrapolation of indeterminacy from
Chadha to all other cases is unsatisfying, other observations
may make it intuitively more palatable. Chadha merely demonstrates that there is at least one case in which doctrine is indeterminate, and it is easy to identify other cases sharing the
same defect. Few scholars would argue that the Supreme
Court's major policy decisions, such as those desegregating the
schools or protecting abortion rights, are compelled by principle. They are highly political decisions that easily could have
been decided the other way, and often were, under the same
governing principle. 225 The only way that those types of deciin a case announcing a common law rule. For present purposes, the concept of
legislative history is also broad enough to encompass any articulable social
norms or background values that might be thought to aid in the resolution of a
case of first impression.
225. Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Supreme Court reversal of position on constitutionality of state-sanctioned racial discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
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sions can even remotely be deemed to have been determined
by principle is by defining the term "principle" in a way that
makes its meaning vary over time with the social and political
values of the pertinent population. Such a flexible definition of
principle may well serve a useful function. By connoting a degree of stability and immutability that reduces the popular
resistance that would otherwise accompany the imposition of
new values, flexible conceptions of principle may both facilitate
social change and provide aspirational objectives for social
changers.2 26 That is, however, hardly an argument supporting
the existence of principled decisionmaking in major social policy cases. It is just a fancy way of saying that the decisions are
subjective. At best, the cases turn on the judge's assessment of
what the subjective values of the majority will tolerate at the
time the decision is rendered. At worst, the cases turn on the
judge's own subjective preferences.
Intuitively, doctrinal indeterminacy would not seem to be
limited to Chadha and the controversial political cases, but
would seem to extend to all litigated cases. By hypothesis
there are valid arguments on both sides of virtually every litigated case. Indeed, the only reason that a case is litigated at all
is that both sides have at least some possibility of winning.
Even in abusive litigation, commenced or defended for purposes of delay or harassment, the abusing party must have an
argument sufficient to avoid summary disposition and liability
for abuse of process. Summary disposition would undermine
the purpose of delay. Liability for abuse of process, either
through an award of attorneys' fees or damages, would nullify
any benefit to be derived from harassment. If this were not the
case, we would presumably alter our procedural and liability
rules to correct for any improper incentives. If virtually all litigated cases could be resolved either way, there is a vast
number of cases in which doctrine is at least potentially indeterminate. One could argue that there are right and wrong doctrinal answers in litigated cases, and that cases are litigated by
the party urging the wrong resolution only in the hope that the
judge will make a mistake. As an intuitive matter, however,
that does not ring true. It is likely that most litigants believe
their positions to be correct, and that most judges believe their
decisions to be correct. The only reason sincere differences of
opinion about proper application of the governing doctrine can
coexist is that the meaning of the doctrine is very uncertain.
226.

See Spann, supra note 2, at 598-602.
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As a practical matter, it is as if doctrine were indeterminate.
Accordingly, those who reject a theoretical demonstration of
doctrinal indeterminacy because it is too removed from "real
world" concerns should be moved by the functional indeterminacy of doctrine. One way or the other, doctrinal indeterminacy appears to be inescapable.
But what about cases in which the proper doctrinal outcome is so clear that no one even bothers to litigate the issue;
how can doctrine be indeterminate in those cases? As it turns
out, there are no such cases. There are only cases in which the
litigants lack either the resources or the imagination to illuminate the doctrinal uncertainties. If enough is at stake to warrant the effort, doctrinal uncertainties can always be found. For
example, article II of the Constitution says that the President
22 7
of the United States must be at least thirty-five years of age.
The provision seems to plainly prohibit a thirty-four year old
from holding the office of President.
As an initial matter, the minimum-age provision of article
II may well be a rule rather than a doctrinal principle. Assuming for the moment that rules are determinate, they do nothing
to establish doctrinal determinacy. Because doctrinal principles are designed to insulate us from subjective preferences,
rules are useful only to the extent that they advance doctrinal
objectives. As has been noted, rules that do not purport to emanate from a principle, but rather serve as a starting point for
analysis, are themselves nothing more than subjective preferences. Their formulation is arbitrary and little can be said to
justify their existence. Therefore, the fact that rules might appear to be determinate could hardly be less consequential. Of
course, nothing really fits this definition of a rule. We rarely
treat rules as the starting point of legal analysis. Rather, a rule
is used as a means of implementing a doctrinal policy. As a result, all of the uncertainties attendant to any doctrinal analysis
accompany efforts to apply the rule.
Assuming that the minimum-age provision of article II is
not itself a mere subjective preference of the Framers but is,
instead, a subsidiary rule designed to advance some unarticulated principle, proper application of the provision would require both specification of the governing principle and
determination of what outcome would best serve that principle.
Both tasks permit the introduction of doctrinal uncertainty into
the analysis. If the governing principle is that Presidents
227.

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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should possess a minimum degree of maturity and experience,

that principle may best be advanced by ignoring the rule in the
case of a particularly precocious thirty-four year old. If the
principle is that literal adherence to certain rules will advance
the long-term interests of the nation more than case-by-case
determinations will, application of the minimum-age provision

will be complicated by the uncertainties involved in ascertaining whether the rule really falls within the scope of that principle, or whether it is more like a speed limit that we permit to
be violated by fire trucks and ambulances. Moreover, the minimum-age provision does not reflect the only principle embodied
in the Constitution. The Constitution also incorporates the

democratic principle that the voters should be able to select the
President of their choice. The manner in which the conflict be-

tween that principle and the minimum-age rule should be resolved is far from .certain.228 The suggestion that latent
uncertainties can be found in seemingly specific constitutional
rules is not fanciful. Finding such uncertainties is something
that the Supreme Court has, in effect, done repeatedly.229 Accordingly, there is no case in which the outcome is so clear that
it escapes the influence of doctrinal indeterminacy.
There is one final way in which doctrinal indeterminacy
can be established as a theoretical matter. Assume that we are
required to determine whether result A or result B is compelled by a particular principle, and we are certain that result
228. The minimum-age provision is also cited in Nagel, Interpretationand
Importance in ConstitutionalLaw: A Re-assessment of Judicial Restrain 25
NoMos 181, 190-93 (1983), along with other examples, in arguing that seemingly
specific constitutional provisions can contain latent ambiguities.
229. In Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937), the Supreme Court refused to
preclude Justice Black from taking his seat on the Supreme Court even though,
by voting as a Senator to increase the retirement benefits of Supreme Court
Justices, Justice Black would appear to have been ineligible for a seat on the
Court by virtue of the article I, § 6 proviso that no member of Congress shall
hold an office whose emoluments were increased while that member was in
Congress. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974), the Supreme Court declined to prohibit members of Congress from simultaneously serving as members of the armed services reserves, despite the
fact that the incompatibility clause of article I, § 6 would appear to prohibit
such simultaneous membership. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974), the Supreme Court refused to order disclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency budget despite the article I, § 9 requirement for periodic publication of a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of
"all" public funds. All of those cases were dismissed on standing grounds, but
it is unlikely that the Court would have permitted itself to be halted by standing barriers if it had believed the underlying constitutional provisions to be important enough to merit enforcement. Realistically, the Court simply chose to
ignore the "plain" meanings of the subject constitutional provision, thereby
causing one to wonder how "plain" their meanings really were.
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A is the correct choice. Those with even a passing appreciation
of the power of psychological techniques of persuasion would
concede that, given the right circumstances and sufficient time,
we could be "convinced" to abandon our initial conclusion and
favor result B. Stated bluntly, we could be brainwashed and
made to change our minds. Doesn't the fact that we can be
made to abandon result A in favor of result B indicate that the
principle governing our selection is indeterminate? If not, it
must be because result A was the truly correct result, and our
preference for result B was caused only by the artificial alteration of our values and perceptions through brainwashing techniques. But where did our initial preference for result A come
from? Wasn't it too merely the result of the way that our values and perceptions were formed through our socialization
processes? Why then is the psychological conditioning that
forced us to shift our allegiance from result A to result B any
more artificial or suspect than the psychological conditioning
that caused us to prefer result A in the first instance? More
significantly, if doctrine is determinate, which is the correct,
doctrinally determined result; the one produced by conditioning process A or the one produced by conditioning process B?
There is, of course, no answer. If human beings reared in Western cultures can be "convinced" to sell each other into slavery
or to slaughter each other by the millions because of their religious beliefs, and to do so in the sincere belief that their actions are permitted by the principles that govern their conduct,
those principles must be so vulnerable to manipulation that
they merit designation as indeterminate. Accordingly, for all of
the theoretical and intuitive reasons that have been discussed,
the indeterminacy evident in Chadha safely can be extrapolated to all other cases.
The legal realists perceived that doctrine was indeterminate quite some time ago. 23 0 The response of many legal realists was to shift the focus of legal analysis from doctrine to the
230. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.)
(prejudices and preconceptions shared by society, as well as idiosyncratic sympathies of judge, find expression in society's legal system); J. FRN LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND xiii, 115 (6th ed. 1963) (judges' temperament, training, biases, and predilections influence decisions); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW

TRADrrION: DECIDING APPEALS 3-4, 11-18, 393 (1960) (human psychology, particular circumstances, and inherent probabilities create nonuniform pattern of decisions); cf.Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. . REV. 429, 435-38 (1934)
(judges often decide cases on policy grounds, then "wring" from legal doctrine
a legally acceptable basis for decision); see generally Note, 'Round and 'Round
the Bramble Busk From Legal Realisin to CriticalLegal Scholarship, 95 HARv.
L. REV. 1669, 1670-76 (1982).
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underlying policies that doctrine was to implement. 23 ' Accordingly, belief in doctrinal determinacy was replaced by belief in
policy determinancy. That legal doctrine could neither control
nor explain the outcomes in particular cases became inconsequential as long as policy considerations could control and explain those outcomes. Although we might have stated the
outcome of a contracts case in the indeterminate language of
consideration or damages, what we were really doing--or at
least should have been doing-was advancing economic efficiency, or social psychological objectives, or whatever goals are
dictated by your favorite social science.
Recently, the critical legal theorists have pointed out that
the legal realists merely moved the indeterminacy from the
level of doctrine to the level of policy. 232 All of the possible social science explanations for case outcomes depend upon both
the validity and determinacy of some governing principle, but
social science principles are as indeterminate as any other
principles. 23 3 Despite their claimed empirical verification-a
claim that was also made for legal doctrine when law was portrayed as a science 2 3-- social science principles invariably incorporate a "fudge factor" that permits them to escape
falsification but, in the process, achieves indeterminacy. If demand increases as price increases, in seeming violation of
price/demand principles, an economist will explain that the
higher price created a new product perceived to be of higher
value, thereby stimulating demand and preserving the validity
of the price/demand principle. If an individual resists rather
than succumbs to peer pressure, in seeming violation of social
psychological principles, the social psychologist will explain
that we have merely failed to identify the relevant peer group,
thereby preserving the validity of peer-pressure principles.
Like lawyers, social scientists are adept at generating analytical
spin. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, policy principles
231.

See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1383,

1384-88; Note, supra note 230, at 1670-76.
232. See Note, supra note 230, at 1677-86, and critical legal theorists cited
therein.

233. See id. Some of the legal realists themselves also recognized this. See,
e.g., Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles,
39 U. CHI.L. REV. 475, 483-85 (1972); cf. Gilmore, ProductsLiability: A Commentary, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 103, 109 (1970) (a desired legal outcome can be obtained
by categorizing a cause of action in a favorable way); see also Left, supra note
198, at 1008-11 (calling attention to Gilmore's appreciation of extreme
relativity).
234. See G. WEr=T, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20-62
(1980).
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work no better than legal principles. 235 Therefore, doctrinal indeterminacy in its broad sense means total indeterminacy. It
means that principle itself can never work and that, as a result,
we are forever consigned to the evils of subjective preferences-the very evils that we initially set out to avoid.
B. DECONSTRUCION
The process of demonstrating indeterminacy is sometimes
referred to as "deconstruction." Deconstruction is a term that
the critical legal theorists have borrowed from proponents of a
current trend in philosophy and literary criticism, which focuses on the problems inherent in using language as a device
for communicating meaning. The author's intended meaning in
making any linguistic assertion-whether in a poem, a philosophical treatise or a constitutional provision--can be shown to
depend upon certain implicit assumptions that the author took
for granted in making the assertion. By highlighting those implicit assumptions, a deconstructive "critique" of the text exposes the subjectivity of the linguistic assertion. For those who
do not share the author's implicit assumptions, but rather bring
to the text their own assumptions, the text has a different
meaning. Moreover, if the implicit assumption is itself imprecise, it can be shown logically to support an assertion that is
contrary to the original assertion made in the text. Accordingly, the author does not "control" the meaning of the text;
meaning emanates from an interactive process between the
language of the text and the particular assumptions made by
the reader.
The majority opinion in Chadha provides a perfect example. Chief Justice Burger held that the Constitution-for present purposes, a "text" containing linguistic assertionsprohibited congressional use of the legislative veto because the
veto did not comply with the article I procedure prescribed for
making "laws." The implicit assumption was that the exercise
of a legislative veto constituted the process of making a "law."
If, like Justice White, one does not share that assumption, one
can conclude that the text-the Constitution--does not prohibit
235. The most popular social science for contemporary legal analysts with a
policy bent to invoke is economics. See Tushnet, supra note 231, at 1388.
Among the articles demonstrating the manipulability of economic reasoning
are Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAT L. REv. 669 (1979); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981); cf. Tushnet,
supra note 231, at 1388-95.
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the legislative veto because the article I enactment procedures
simply do not apply. For Justice White, the text means something different than it means for Chief Justice Burger, and both
meanings may differ from the meanings intended by the various Framers, who relied upon their own assumptions in authoring the text. No particular meaning is more "correct" than any
other; the reader of a text will simply be persuaded by the view
that most nearly coincides with the reader's own subjective
assumptions.
One might argue that there is a perfectly good, nonsubjective way to choose between the majority and dissenting views
of the constitutionality of the legislative veto and ascertain the
true meaning of the text; one need simply determine whether a
legislative veto really is or is not a "law." However, the charm
of deconstruction lies in its relentless availability to expose the
subjective foundation of any seemingly objective assertion.
The question of what constitutes a "law" can, for example, be
shown to turn on implicit assumptions about what constitutes a
"right," which in turn, can be shown to turn on implicit assumptions about moral philosophy, which in turn, can be
shown to turn on implicit assumptions about social interdependence... and so on. Because any text can be deconstructed,
the meaning of a text is indeterminate; it has as many different
meanings as it has readers who bring to it their own sets of
236
subjective values and assumptions.
The paradox is that the same text can have simultaneous
contradictory meanings, and in a legal text, an operative principle can tolerate simultaneous contradictory results. On a modest level, the paradox can be unsettling: we invented principle
because we were unable to tolerate total subjectivity, yet the
only way that principle can work is through recourse to subjective preferences. On a cosmic level, the paradox can be downright disturbing: if there is no principle because there is only
subjectivity, then there may be no reality, only subjective perceptions. As if that were not enough, on an analytical level, the
236. The foregoing discussion of deconstruction is somewhat stylized.
There are ways in which deconstruction in the legal context has taken on a life
of its own, with connotations that do not necessarily accompany literary and
philosophical deconstruction. Nevertheless, it is the indeterminacy that has
been attributed to legal deconstruction that is of concern for present purposes.
For a general discussion of literary and philosophical deconstruction, see C.
NoRms, DEcoNsTRucTIoN THEORY & PRACTICE (1982). For an example of deconstruction in a legal context, which focuses on substantive criminal law doctrines, see Kelman, Interpretive Constructionin the Substantive CriminalLaw,

33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 669-73 (1981).
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paradox simply makes everything fall apart: if all principles
can be deconstructed, the principles on which deconstruction
itself are based can also be deconstructed, thereby leaving us
with nothing. The only reason that deconstruction might seem
alarming, however, is that we do not yet understand how to understand it. To the extent that deconstruction is able to prompt
whatever paradigm shifts are necessary to take us to new
levels of understanding, it is not deconstruction at all. It is the
threshold of reconstruction-the vehicle for moving us from
here to whatever comes next.
It is necessary to understand the full scope of the problem
in order for the solution to be appreciated fully. At least as a
theoretical matter, doctrinal indeterminacy is simply the first
step along a very slippery slope that inevitably leads to total
deconstruction of everything. The reason that doctrine is indeterminate is that principles themselves are indeterminate. The
reason that principles are indeterminate is that they derive
their operative meaning from subjective preferences, which are
either random or are the end product of countless influencing
factors whose operation and interaction we cannot even begin
to understand. Even those who believe that subjective preferences are arrived at after an exercise of free will cannot explain
why free will was exercised in one particular way rather than
another. What ultimately emerges is a world in which all
truths are contingent upon subjective preferences, about which
virtually nothing is understood. Because of the contingent nature of everything important, it is difficult to have confidence in
the correctness of the choices that one makes. And if everything is so contingent, one might well ask "why bother?"
Traditional legal scholars tend to have two reactions to total deconstruction. The first one is one of xenophobic alarm,
which, although easy to understand, is difficult to defend. The
second response, which is shared by many of the deconstructionists themselves, is more serious. This response is one of
apprehension about deconstruction because it offers nothing to
replace what it tears down. The implication appears to be that,
unless paired with a constructive program, deconstruction insights would be better left unexplored. This response, however, is also difficult to defend, particularly because it poses the
risk of suppressing whatever benefits stand to be derived from
legal deconstruction.
Deconstruction does differ from traditional analysis, but
that is no cause for alarm. True, deconstruction challenges our
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intuitions by pushing our assumptions to their logical extremes, but the assumptions and the logic with which they are
pushed are our own inventions. Because these inventions are
not natural truths, we have the power to modify them whenever we perceive a need to do so. It is also true that deconstruction precludes determinate meaning. Once deconstructed,
it becomes apparent that things have no substance of their
own. Things are only what they appear to be, and appearances
can be manipulated in a thousand different ways. But we have
known that for a very long time. Eskimos are said to have
names for several different types of snow, because they believe
the distinctions between those types to have meaning for their
lives. New Yorkers categorize snow only by whether it is clean
or dirty. How many types of snow are there really? Naturally,
the answer to that question depends upon the way that you
look at things. Similarly, we used to believe that slavery was
tolerable and that women belonged in the kitchen. Now we
condemn slavery and believe that women belong on the
Supreme Court. Now we look at things differently, and because
we do, things are different.
The thought that the constitutional status of the legislative
veto is an indeterminate, self-contradictory function of the way
that one happens to look at separation of powers should not be
unsettling. Many phenomena-some of which are intimately
connected to fundamental conceptions about reality-are commonly recognized to have no existence apart from the theoretical constructs that we have created for them, and many of
those constructs contain inherent contradictions. In order to
explain the observed properties of light, we sometimes pretend
that it is a particle, and sometimes pretend that it is a wave.
We do so even though we know that it is neither and cannot be
both.237 Nevertheless, we manage to sleep at night after turning off the inherently contradictory phenomenon.
Subatomic nuclear physics makes tolerance of the contradictions inherent in light look like child's play. If one were now
to suggest that matter is made up of atoms with tiny electrons
orbiting a nucleus composed of protons and neutrons, it would
take a very polite physicist not to laugh out loud. Subatomic
physics can no longer be conceptualized in ways that can be reduced to descriptive pictures. It can only be conceptualized in
a universe where one looks at things as probabilities described
237. See H. PAGELS, supra note 198, at 23-24, 67.
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by equations rather than as three-dimensional objects. 23 8
Moreover, the nature and history of scientific progress indicate
that if there is anything that we know about the natural sciences, it is that by tomorrow we will realize that everything we
know today is wrong. Nevertheless, the natural sciences are
typically thought to embody our best approximations of objective reality.
Even mathematicians, whose discipline is very precise and
rigorous, realized decades ago that the categories of "true" and
"false" were not exhaustive, thereby undermining the foundation of a logical system that is much more formal than the logic
we employ to ascertain doctrinal answers to our legal
problems. 23 9 If assertions of formal logic can be neither true
nor false, it should not be surprising that, under the less precise system of legal analysis, the legislative veto can be neither
constitutional nor unconstitutional. 240 If we can tolerate massive amounts of contradiction, inconsistency, and uncertainty
with respect to mathematics and the natural sciences, one
would think that the contradictions, inconsistencies, and uncertainties produced by deconstruction of law and the social sciences could be tolerated as well. That has yet to be the case,
however.
Legal deconstruction has generated its fair share of alarmist opposition, 241 but so did Copernicus's suggestion that the
Earth was not the center of the universe, Pasteur's belief that
invisible germs caused disease, and Columbus's insistence that
the Earth was round. Opposition based on nothing more than
the fact that deconstruction is different, and therefore threatening, is not particularly helpful. Certainly, deconstructive techniques have made a sufficient threshold showing to merit more
serious analytical responses. 242
Some criticism of deconstruction has been substantial.
Questions about methodology or the implications of decon238. See id. at 235-2.
239. See M. KLNE, MATHEMATICS: THE LOSS OF CERTAINTY 260-64 (1980)
(discussing Godel's "undecideability" theorem).
240. Cf.L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 47 (arguments about constitutional law ultimately cannot be limited to the parameters of a closed system comprised of
mere constitutional argument, but must be broadly-based in politics, philosophy, and history).
241. See, e.g., Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS Land
36 STAN. L. REv. 413 (1983).
242. Perhaps one explanation for some hostile responses to deconstruction
relates to its coincidental association with the Marxist objectives of many of
the critical legal theorists who practice deconstruction. See, e.g., THE PoLrrmcs
OF LAW: A PROGRESSrVE CmrQuE 6 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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struction are likely to advance legal analysis. Indeed, whether
deconstruction accomplishes anything that is at all useful is a
serious question. Some have argued that deconstruction, without more, leads to extreme cynicism, and even nihilism, that
can be counterproductive. Accordingly, they argue that, unless
deconstruction can be shown to lead to constructive strategies
for the improvement of legal analysis, the costs of deconstruction outweigh the benefits. 243 Some deconstructionists themselves appear to have taken this criticism to heart and have
made the initial movements toward the formulation of a postdeconstruction program of legal analysis. Indeed, the current
preoccupation of the critical legal school appears to be with the
development of a constructive program. 244 Exploring the implications of deconstruction is desirable, but insisting upon the
development of a positive, constructive program is dangerous.
Deconstruction is tricky because its techniques can be applied to its own assertions. This has two consequences. The
first is that any proposal for a constructive program is doomed
to failure. Because any proposal can be deconstructed, no proposal can ever command the respect of those who insist on
principled justification as a prerequisite to action. That realization has frustrated those who hoped to use deconstructive techniques as a means for advancing their own social, political, and
economic objectives. 245 In addition, those attempting to develop affirmative, constructive programs have, even in the process of doing so, recognized the necessary shortcomings of
their proposals. As a result, they have tended to make only the
modest claims of a partial and tentative first effort.246
The second consequence of deconstruction is even more
fundamental. Because deconstructive techniques can be applied to deconstruction itself, it is difficult to know precisely
what to make of perceptions of indeterminacy. Deconstruction
is appealing because it logically follows from the many observations that have already been discussed. It is equally true, however, that deconstruction has no appeal whatsoever because
243. See, e.g., Hutchinson and Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Though 36 STN. I
REv.- (1983).
244. Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HAnv. L REV. 563, 577648 (1983); see Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S I.J. 229, 239-48 (1983)
(reviewing THE Porrcs OF LAw (D. Kairys ed. 1982)).
245. See Dalton, supra note 244, at 231-39; Tushnet, supra note 198, at 281
(demonstrating how deconstruction can interfere with politically-motivated
analysis).

246. See Unger, supra note 244, at 576-83; Dalton, supra note 244, at 246-48.
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the logic and principles from which it emanates can themselves
be deconstructed. Accordingly, in addition to the relatively minor doctrinal inconsistencies that deconstruction exposes, it
also contradicts itself in the most fundamental way imaginable.
It both asserts and denies its own validity. Roaming about in
the midst of such potentially paralyzing perceptions can be perilous. The peril, however, lies not in the risk that we will succumb to analytical paralysis. Rather, it lies in the risk that we
will not.
If there is a benefit to be derived from deconstruction, it is
that deconstruction will serve as a stimulus to spur us along to
whatever forms of understanding come next. Again, the natural sciences provide a useful analogy. We used to think the
Earth was flat, and now we think it is round. In order to move
from the flat to the round paradigm, it was necessary to have
perceptions that were inconsistent with flatness, such as the
ability to sail around the globe. Today we think that the Earth
is round, but who knows what shape it will become tomorrow
when we have imbibed a few more perceptions? Similarly, we
used to think that matter was made up of little balls spinning
around other little balls, but now we think of matter in terms of
descriptive equations. 247 Again, in order to move from the ball
paradigm to the equation paradigm, it was necessary to have
perceptions that were inconsistent with the ball paradigm.
Legal analysis is presently caught in a paradigm that cannot explain the phenomena exposed by deconstruction. Traditional legal analysis is a "normal science," and deconstruction
may well be the harbinger of a "deviant science" that will
shortly replace it.248 It is not clear what the characteristics or
parameters of that deviant science will be, but the form of analysis that it condones is likely to harmonize the contradictions
exposed through deconstruction. Revolutions in scientific
thought suggest that this is the case.
The likely way that deviant science will become normal science is through some sort of a paradigm shift that permits what
now appear to be mutually-exclusive or contradictory observations to peacefully coexist. 249 The paradigm shift will change
how we look at things in a way that supplants the present apparent contradictions. After the paradigm shift, the presently
247.
248.
(1962).
249.

See supra note 198 at 235-42.
See generally T. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENrc REVOLUTIONS
See id. at 52-53.
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impossible will be as commonplace as television, airplanes, and
nuclear reactors-all of which used to be quite impossible. The
paradigm shift is unlikely to occur, however, if we manage to
suppress, ignore, or somehow domesticate deconstruction.
Ironically, any benefits that deconstruction has to offer are
more likely to be realized if we revel in it, appreciating every
nook and cranny, than if we try to compromise it in order to
produce a positive, constructive program that will not upset our
present world view. If the implications of deconstruction are
indeed as counterintuitive as they appear to be, deconstruction
may be program enough in itself. Deconstruction may constitute the beginning of reconstruction, and our job may be simply
not to get in the way of whatever comes next.
III.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional analysis of the legislative veto is indeterminate in a way that can be extrapolated to all efforts at principled decisionmaking. As a result, it is apparent that principle
does not work and that we are left at the mercy of our subjective preferences. Because our subjective preferences are not
reliable enough to serve as the basis for rational decisionmaking, we cannot make rational decisions. Our decisions are
either random or are determined by forces that we cannot control or understand. Moreover, those decisions are riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions of which we do not approve,
but about which we can do very little. Even the deconstructive
techniques used to expose the contradictions and reveal these
fundamental "truths" can be turned against themselves and
made to undermine the validity of their own assertions. In the
final analysis, there is nothing but confusion.
Some may find such perceptions debilitating because there
is no hope of ever being right. Others may find them liberating
because there is no danger of being wrong. The power of the
perceptions, however, lies in their simultaneous assertion and
negation of both right and wrong. We cannot yet cope with
such absolute contingency. But if anything useful is to come of
all this, it may be the development of new ways of understanding that reconcile so many irreconcilable contradictions. And
certainly such progress-the arrival at new levels of understanding-will have been worth the troubles encountered along
the way.
Perhaps the undercurrent of optimism that has accompanied the suggested potential of indeterminacy is wholly unwar-
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ranted. Perhaps the new insights permitting us to understand
tomorrow what we cannot understand today will simply make
our understanding different rather than more advanced. Perhaps there is only movement and no direction. Perhaps there
is not even movement. Rationality cannot resolve these matters. As a result, rationality has historically traveled in the
company of religion, and those who insist on weaving ideas of
progress into their justifications will have to make at least a little leap of faith.

